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ABSTRACT
Many forms of consumption tax, including recent proposals to impose a tax on 
the use of carbon, impose disproportionate burde mmentators who 
propose mitigating this impact with tax reba e families have 
overlooked the importance of the timing of consumption for these households, as well 
as the diffic
wid
bot
wo
add
sig
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nec
pro
inv
me
sug
cap
fro
sam
as s x.    
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ns on the poor.  Co
tes for low-incom
ulties of “smoothing” income from one time period to another.  We survey a 
e array of evidence suggesting that poor households lack affordable mechanisms for 
h borrowing and saving, such that a lump-sum rebate, or even monthly rebates, 
uld not leave the household as well off as they were in the absence of any tax.  In 
ition, we show that the cognitive features of a rebate will be problematic for short-
hted households---those who heavily favor the present over the future.  For example, 
y may impatiently spend rebates too quickly, leaving little money for later 
essities, and potentially increasing overall carbon usage.  And they likely will 
crastinate both learning how to overcome these problems, as well as putting off 
esting in less carbon-intensive goods.   
 We do not, however, argue against carbon pricing.  Instead, we offer new 
thods of structuring taxes and rebates to overcome these problems.  For instance, we 
gest that rebates be offered on a “self-directed” debit card, subject to a sticky default 
 on weekly withdrawals.  This implement “nudges” short-sighted households away 
m impatience, while offering affordable credit and modern banking to all.  These 
e mechanisms can be used for other forms of transactional consumption taxes, such 
tate sales taxes or a possible national value-added ta
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INTRODUCTION 
Wh strophic climate change?1  Should it be the rich, who can 
more easi
dra
challenging
climate change have attempted to avoid them through proposals that claim to be “distributionally 
neu
pro
wo
ho
In 
designed they do not actually achieve distributional neutrality.  We go on to proffer more 
car
 
2
o should pay to prevent cata
ly bear the costs?2  Or the poor, whose poverty makes them more vulnerable to 
matic changes in the environment,3 and so arguably have more to gain?  These are 
 questions, and contemporary advocates of major policies aimed at preventing 
tral.”4  For example, some of those who suggest increasing the price of greenhouse-gas 
duction to account for its damage to the global climate claim that, though their schemes 
uld fall more heavily on the poor, this burden can be balanced out by providing a tax rebate to 
useholds with the lowest incomes.5  Pending legislation incorporates a similar rebate feature.6  
this Article, we argue that although these rebate schemes are nobly intentioned, as currently 
efully tailored alternatives that might get closer to true equality.   
                                                 
or on overview of the scientific consensus on the dangers of climate change, see INTERGOVERNMENT
IMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT EMISSIONS SCENARIOS (2000); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
1 F AL PANEL ON 
CL  
CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (2007); 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT (2007) [hereinafter WGII]. 
2 Rumi Shammin & Clark W. Bullard, Impact of Cap-and-Trade Policies for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
on U.S. Households, 68 ECOL. ECON. 2432, 2436 (2009). 
3 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WGII, at 8. 
4 Gilbe
Gilb
Ch
5 T
De
513
Leg
6 H
OF  20 (2009). 
rt E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 499, 516 (2009); 
ert E. Metcalf, A Proposal for a US. Carbon Tax Swap: An Equitable Tax Reform to Address Global Climate 
ange, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-12, at 16, 19 (Oct. 2007). 
erry Dinan & Diane Lim Rogers, Distributional Effects of Carbon Allowance Trading: How Government 
cisions Determine Winners and Losers, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 199, 206 (2002); Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 
--14 & n.66; David Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon Emissions Control and the Rules of 
slative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. __, manuscript at 6 (fori thcoming 2010); Metcalf, supra note 4, at 11--20.  
.R. 2454 (proposed 2009); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE 
H.R. 2454 AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at
 3
 
To see the central problem of the rebate scheme, consider: Would you rather be poor for 
eleven months, and rich for one, or middle-class the whole year round?  From the way they 
be
wi
ty
ins
we are poor.9     
The carbon tax/rebate schemes neglect this basic point.   The tax raises prices for 
ho  the year, reducing their standard of living.  In the case of households of 
very low in
pe
pe
rent or not, eating three meals a day or two.  A repayment of $1,000 at year’s end does n t fully 
alleviate this lower standard of living; empty stomachs cannot be retroactively filled. 
ten
have, it looks like most people would prefer the latter: a “smooth” income is better than one 
th the same total value but more peaks and valleys.7  That’s because the pain of the lows is, 
pically, worse than the satisfaction of the pinnacles.8  Thus, we save up for rainy days, or 
ure against them, transferring money from ourselves when we are wealthy to ourselves when 
10
useholds throughout
comes, even a modest tax --- carbon tax estimates tend to run in the vicinity of $1,200 
r household annually --- could represent a substantial loss in wealth.11  The drop from $1,000 
r month in household income to $900 is a steep one: it means the difference between making 
o
Of course, the proponents of these schemes probably did not just overlook a fundamental 
et of modern economics.  Instead, they likely assume that households can convert the lumpy 
                                                 
7 ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 187--88 (1995). 
8 Id. at 185. 
9 Id. at 187--8
10 An exception is David Super, who briefly acknowledges that poor households may face higher energy costs 
dur
tim
 Although we adopt the common lingo in terming these levies a “carbon tax,” most proposals would also 
include taxes on the production of greenhouse gasses other than carbon dioxide.  Metcalf, supra note 4, at 12.   
11 Congressional Budget Office, Trade-Offs in Allocating Allowances for CO  Emissions Tbl.1 (2007) (estimating 
cos  dollars); Dinan & 
Lim  note 5, at 212 Tbl.4 (estimating average household cost for 15% reduction at $1,209, or $1488 in 
200 reenstein et al., Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Designing Climate-Change 
Leg
<htt
hom
htt
8. 
ing different parts of the year that borrowing cannot satisfy.  He urges policy makers to target assistance to those 
es.  Super, supra note 5, at 64--65.    
2
ts of a 15% reduction in carbon emissions for median households at $960, or $1184 in 2009
 Rogers, supra
9 dollars); Robert G
islation that Shields Low-Income Households from Increased Poverty and Hardship,  
p://www.cbpp.org/files/10-25-07climate.pdf>, at 1 (May 9, 2008) (putting estimated cost for lowest quintile of 
es at $750 and increasing over time).  For inflation calculations, see The Inflation Calculator, 
p://www.westegg.com/inflation. 
  
4
tax/rebate combination into a smooth income stream simply by borrowing against it.  If that were 
true, then we would have little objection to the claim that the tax/rebate combination is 
di
eview here, the evidence shows overwhelmingly that low-income 
households
po
borrowers from deadbeats who will skip town before their check arrives, they must charge 
exorbitant rates to break even.  And because the borrowers have few alternatives, and may not 
ev
am
ab 13 uires a certain amount of awareness 
of one’s own household finances, as well as a modest amount of sophistication and enterprise in 
order to understand them and translate that knowledge into the act of applying for a loan.  Again, 
ev e
ag
reb
survey evidence drawn from sources as varied as studies of tax rebates to analyses of gym 
         
stributively neutral. 
Unfortunately, as we r
 cannot easily borrow, even against a guaranteed future payment.12  For one thing, 
or households generally lack a credit history.  Since lenders cannot easily tell conscientious 
en recognize the high cost of the complex fees they face, there is little price competition 
ong lenders who serve poor communities.    
Another problem with the rebate is that it strains the limits of many households’ cognitive 
ilities.   Borrowing to offset an expected tax increase req
idence sugg sts that these problems have prevented many families from borrowing even 
ainst guaranteed future income.   
While it might seem that these problems can easily by banished simply by paying out the 
ate in advance, that structure, too, creates serious havoc for some households.  Here, too, we 
                                        
ne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation Over Time, 59 TAX L. REV. 1, 34 (2005) (“[B]ehavioral factors and capital 
rket imperfections limit the ability of taxpayers to fully smooth consumption.”).  We build on Fennell and Stark’s 
m that there are failures in the market for credit for low-income households.  We also explain how those failures 
ect the design of consumption taxes.  Stark and Fennell limit their discussion to the income tax.     
12 We are not the first to observe that credit markets and the timing of taxation can affect social welfare.  See Lee 
An
ma
work by adding, for the first time in the legal literature, a comprehensive survey of the evidence in support of their 
clai
aff
13 For discussion of the points in this paragraph, see infra Part II.B. 
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membership fees.14  What we see overwhelmingly is that households are impatient: they spend 
sudden windfalls, rather than saving them.  Thus a prepaid rebate would, like one that comes at 
the
ele
the
tec
explain, are more acute for low-income families. 
Prepayment not only affects the fairness of a carbon tax, but also may undermine its 
en such as cap-and-trade regimes, are 
designed to 
de
red 16
households who receive a prepayment may well increase their consumption of carbon-intensive 
goods.  
t 
to 
pro rrent rebate proposals, we suggest a set of alternatives that would mitigate these 
problems, a
For example, we suggest that rebates be dispersed through a self-directed debit card, or 
“SDD.”  The SDD allows recipients to draw down their rebate throughout the year, without 
 end of the year, leave families with excess cash for one month and poorer for the other 
ven.  Moreover, impatience leads to procrastination: because the present is more valuable than 
 future, many taxpayers would not invest in efforts to understand a carbon tax or in 
hnologies to reduce their future carbon consumption.  Both these sets of problems, as we 
vironmental goals.  Carbon taxes and other similar policies, 
force users and producers of carbon to take account of the social cost of their 
cisions.15  By increasing the price to reflect the harms carbon does to others, the taxes aim to 
uce carbon production to a socially optimal level.   As we model here, however, impatient 
17
It is worth emphasizing that our goal is not to argue agains carbon pricing, but is instead 
improve the design of any pricing system.  Thus, after we have identified the likely timing 
blems of cu
s well as offering some other side-benefits to poorer communities.   
                                                 
aul Ekins & Terry Barker, Carbon Taxes and Carbon Emissions Trading, in ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
ONOMICS 75, 77--79 (Nick Hanley & Colin J. Roberts eds., 2002); Nicholas Bull et al., Who Pays Broad-Based 
14 For discussion of this paragraph, see infra Part III.  
15 P
EC
Energy Taxes? Computing Lifetime and Regional Incidence, 15 E  J. 145, 147 (1994). 
16 That is, the 
product create
17 See
NERGY
carbon tax is a “pigouvian” tax, a levy priced according to the size of the negative externality the 
s for others.  Id.     
 infra Part III.C. 
  
6
p-and-trade regimes, and notes their dependence on the assumption that taxpayers 
uld smooth their incomes without very high costs.  It also shows that a prebate regime will 
ve analogous shortcomings.  Part III relaxes the assumption in Part II that households have 
having to incur massive fees from the “fringe” lending industry.  The amount of funds available 
each week, however, by default is limited in advance, subject to modification by the card-holder.  
Th
he
un
he 18
benefit of expanding access to electronic transactions and other everyday banking services many 
of us take for granted, but which are unavailable to most of the poorest households.      
rea
sales taxes 
im 19
cognitive problems we outline here.  And they, too, could benefit from our proposed 
improvements.   
an
sk  consequences of various consumption tax proposals, including carbon 
taxes and ca
smooth their incomes across the entire year.  Part II considers the true distributive effects of a 
combined consumption tax/rebate regime, arguing that it is very unlikely many poor households 
co
ha
                                                
us, a taxpayer who fears she will overspend once she gets access to her rebate can pre-commit 
rself to spreading the rebate out over the course of the year.  That commitment could be 
done, but only through a cumbersome process.  We thereby preserve consumer choice, while 
lping to nudge taxpayers away from temptation.   Issuing debit cards also has the useful 
Although we frame our discussion here around carbon pricing, our analysis could also be 
dily translated to any other form of consumption tax.  Many leading proposals for national 
or value-added taxes include some kind of rebate to soften their disproportionate 
pact on low-income households.   These proposals, too, have ignored the timing and 
The Article proceeds in Six Parts.  Part I first explains the basic welfarist economic 
alysis of distributive justice, and its implications for saving and borrowing behavior.  It then 
etches the distributive
 
18 O
DECIS
19 Fo
ur methodology here owes an obvious debt to RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
IONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 105--120 (rev’d and expanded ed. 2009). 
r a survey, see infra Part I.B. 
  
stable preferences over time, and shows that time-inconsistency will only exacerbate the general 
problems identified in Part II.  .  Part IV sets out our proposed reforms.  Part V considers some 
ge
pa
ju
 NEUTRAL” 
REBATES 
In t
dis  Under the standard approach, consumption taxes are widely acknowledged 
to impose
tax
for
may safely skip to Part I.C. 
erent ways to decide how to fairly distribute the burden of 
paying for government.  In this Article we focus mostly on “welfarism,” the analytical tool of 
choice fo cause it is 
the metric u
engage those proposals on their own terms.    
                                                
7
sed by those who propose the consumption taxes we criticize, and our goal is to 
21
neral objections to our framework, in particular the possible claims that our approach is 
ternalist, and that our approach is irrelevant because the only important measure of distributive 
stice is over a lifetime, not annually.  Part VI concludes.    
I. CONSUMPTION TAXES AND “DISTRIBUTIONALLY
his Part we introduce the basics of how economists usually approach questions of 
tributive justice. 
 an excessive burden on poor taxpayers.  Thus, as we outline, most major consumption 
 proposals include some mechanism for softening that blow, typically in the form of a rebate 
 taxpayers below a given income threshold.  Readers already familiar with these proposals 
A. Distributive Justice in a Welfarist Framework 
There are, of course, many diff
r many economists and other policy analysts.20  We emphasize welfarism be
 
20 J
21 I
Hedonic Psychology and the Ambiguities of “Welfare,” 33 P . P . AFF. 391, 391 (2005). 
ONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, at G-11 (2d ed. 2007). 
n addition, virtually all ethical systems agree that welfare has at least some moral weight.  Mark Kelman, 
HIL  & UB
  
8
 Welfarism is a variant of utilitarianism.22  As in Bentham’s original utilitarian approach, 
it aims to measure the sum of every individual’s utility, which is usually defined in turn as the 
de
ev
so
of 25
by a society in which wealth is highly concentrated, those feelings of demoralization would 
lower overall welfare.   The welfarist would say that, given such an SWF, a society with more 
eq
red  on 
average, h 28
less each additional dollar gained or lost is worth in utility.  If Charlie has one thousand dollars, 
                                                
gree to which each person is able to achieve their subjective preferences.23  The sum total of 
ery person’s preferences is the “social welfare function,” or SWF.24  Welfarism departs 
mewhat from Bentham, though, in permitting each person’s preference for the fair distribution 
goods to itself count in the SWF.   For instance, if there were some who would be troubled 
26
uitably distributed wealth would be preferable to the inequitable one.27   
 In addition to incorporating other ethical systems, welfarism itself recommends 
istribution from rich to poor in many circumstances.  The basic premise is that each of us,
as a diminishing marginal utility of wealth.   That is, the richer we already are, the 
 
22 M
23 L
whe
sup
The Problems of Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 192--93 (2001) (same).  Some scholars argue 
instead for simple happiness.  John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis, GEO. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2010).  Others 
maintain that, in light of the possibility that people will not choose what is best for themselves, the better metric 
wo Ca bility an
Wel
vie
PO
pre
24 A
25 A
25,
sho
22, 
26 S
DIS
(de
27 A
BR N ECONO ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 393, 396.   
28 G
ATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 25 (2006) 
OUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 16 (2002).  There is some controversy on 
ther subjective preference-satisfaction is the best measure of an individual’s well-being.  See ADLER & POSNER, 
ra note 22, at 29--35 (sketching the controversy); Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children’s Children’s Children: 
uld be the extent to which society achieves a more objective view of the good life.  Amartya Sen, pa d 
-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).  Although both these l
ws have points in their favor, as neither of these views is yet mainstream among policy analysts, see ADLER & 
SNER, supra note 22, at 40, in this paper we will generally take welfare to mean the satisfaction of subjective 
ferences.    
DLER & POSNER, supra note 22, at 23. 
DLER & POSNER, supra note 22, at 25.  On the indifference of utilitarians to distribution, see Solum, supra note 
 at 191.  Some welfarists also distinguish themselves from Bentham on the grounds that Bentham believed utility 
uld be measured according to happiness rather than satisfaction of preferences.  ADLER & POSNER, supra note 
at 29--31.   
ee David W. Pearce, Framework for Assessing the Distribution of Environmental Quality, in THE 
TRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 23, 62--63 (Nick Johnstone & Yse Serret eds., 2006) 
scribing how SWF takes account of preferences for fairness).  
DLER & POSNER, supra note 22, at 25; Dale W. Jorgenson et al., Carbon Taxes and Economic Welfare, 1992 
OOKINGS PAPERS O MIC 
RUBER, supra note 20, at 29--30. 
  
9
and loses five hundred, he is in serious trouble, and may face hunger or eviction.  If he has one 
million dollars, and loses five hundred, he is mildly bummed.  Thus welfarists agree that some 
de
saving an
m 30
Charlie knows he will retire one day, and earn only one-tenth his current income, he should put 
money in the bank, so that the utility cost of the dollars he must spend for upkeep in retirement 
wi
mu
wi
be
Borrowing is similar, but with time’s arrow reversed.32  Borrowing increases our wealth 
now but decreases it later.  If we expect to be richer when payment comes due, this should 
inc at many of us may be liquidity constrained: we cannot 
borrow th
ab
ve
gree of transfer from the richest to the poorest is often likely to increase social welfare.29   
The idea of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth also has important implications for 
d borrowing.  If Charlie is rational, he will attempt to smooth his expenditures, so as to 
ove the pain of losing money from his poorest times to his richest times.   For example, if 
ll be much smaller.31  In saving, Charlie gives up consumption today, but that doesn’t hurt as 
ch, because today he is rich.  If we sum up all of Charlie’s utility across his life, his net utility 
ll be higher when he saves, because the cost of putting money away is smaller than the gain of 
ing able to spend it later.   
rease our welfare.  The problem is th
e full, utility-maximizing amount.33  For example, we may have private information 
out our own future earning potential, which it would be difficult for a lender to obtain or 
rify.34  This is the rationale behind, for example, government subsidies for student loans.35   
                                                 
DLER & POSNER, supra note 22, at 23.  We qualify the language in the text because most welfarists argue that 
, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in 
distributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 680--81 (1994). 
7, 1799 (1996); Lee Anne Fennell, Taxing Willpower 8 (unpublished manuscript, May 8, 2009). 
rowning & Lusardi, supra note 30, at 1800. 
29 A
redistribution also creates transaction costs, such as the possibility that taxes on high-earners might discourage work.  
See
Re
30 Martin Browning & Annamaria Lusardi, Household Saving: Micro Theories and Micro Facts, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 
179
31 B
32 GRUBER, supra note 20, at 636--37. 
33 Fennell & Stark, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 12. 
34 Fennell & Stark, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 12; Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption 
Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745, 770 (2007). 
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 Finally, it is important for our later discussion to emphasize that there can be complex 
interactions between the welfarist arguments for redistribution, savings, and borrowing.  In 
pa
ha
ma
So
depend on our ability to determine individuals’ ability to save or borrow.    
 Consumption taxes may have undesirable distributive consequences when evaluated 
under a w ds like: a tax on the 
purchase 
First, the poor consume a larger portion of their income.   Since they spend more and save less, 
if h  
rticular, note that many people who look relatively poor by some measures today may in fact 
ve the ability to borrow against ample future earnings (consider medical students).36  Others 
y look wealthy because they have borrowed heavily, but in the long run will in fact be poor.  
 the question of whether redistribution today will increase society’s current welfare may 
 B.  Existing Tax and Rebate Proposals 
elfarist framework.  A consumption tax is just what it soun
or use of goods and services.37  Sales taxes are a typical example.38 
 Consumption taxes are more burdensome for poorer taxpayers in two distinct ways.  
39
we measure the burden of consumption tax by t e percentage of a person’s income it uses up,
                                                                                                                                                             
RUBER, supra note 20, at 288. 
 Henrik Klinge Jacobsen et al., Distributional Implications of Environmental Taxes in Denmark, 24 FISCAL 
UDIES 477, 478 (2003) (“[M]any households with low current incomes are students or pensioners with higher 
35 G
36 See
ST
lifetime income.”). 
37 Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 961 (1992). 
38 WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 605--14 (9th ed. 2009).  A 
point worth noting for any “tax geeks” among our readers is that we use the term “consumption tax” to refer to what 
is more technically known as a “transactional consumption tax.”  George K. Yin, Accommodating the “Low 
Inco in a Ca ax World, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 445, 450 (1995).  The transactional tax 
shoul ption tax,” which is simply a consumption tax collected out of 
inc
to i
con
We --
30 
39 D
Na
me” sh-Flow or Consumed Income T
d be distinguished from a “cash-flow consum
ome: that is, it is an income tax with a deduction for savings.  Id. at 451--52.  The timing mismatches we alluded 
n the Introduction are perhaps avoidable under a cash-flow consumption tax.  For one thing, a cash-flow 
sumption tax could achieve progressivity simply by changing its rate structure.  Joseph Bankman & David A. 
isbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over and Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1428
06).   (20
inan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 209; Daniel R. Feenberg et al., Distributional Effects of Adopting a 
tional Retail Sales Tax, 11 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 49, 86 (1997). 
 consumption taxes will occupy much more of the budgets of the indigent than the relatively 
better-off.        
r  poor saved comparable amounts, consumption taxes would still be 
harder on
an 
the 42
$10,000.  Both spend all their income on consumption, which is taxed at 10%.  Raheem will pay 
$100,000 in tax, leaving him with a quite comfortable $900,000 for consumption.  Parvati will be 
lef
tax
uti
sm 43
 Most existing consumption taxes recognize this disparity and attempt to correct for it.  
For example, the sales tax laws of most U.S. states exempt rent and food prepared in the home 
fro  the burden of the sales tax on those whose expenditures are mostly 
food and 
tax
 
11
40
 Even if ich and
 the poor because of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth.41  A tax that demands 
equal percentage of the budgets of two different people will impose a greater utility loss on 
 one who is poorer.   For example, suppose Raheem earns $1 million per year and Parvati 
t with $9,000, and may have to trim back her grocery budget.  More technically, Parvati’s 10% 
 comes out of very high-priority goods, and hence goods that provide a very large amount of 
lity, while Raheem’s comes out of goods from which the average consumer would derive very 
all utility.  
m tax, in order to mitigate
shelter.44  In Europe modern Value-Added Taxes, a form of transactional consumption 
 imposed on both consumer goods and their inputs, follow a similar approach;45 previously, 
                                                 
seholds also spend a higher portion of their incomes on carbon-intensive products.  Shammin & Bullard, supra 
e 2, at 2436. 
ohn C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434, 
 (1953). 
40 Dinan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 210; Greenstein et al., supra note 11, at 1; Yin, supra note 38, at 459.  Poor 
hou
not
41 JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX 88 (1989) 
42 J
434
43 GRUBER, supra note 20, at 29--30. 
44 Donald Bruce and William F. Fox, E-Commerce in the Context of Declining State Sales Tax Bases, 53 NAT’L TAX 
J. 1373, 1375--76 (2000); Robert F. Van Brederode, A Normative Evaluation of Consumption Tax Design: The 
Tre
LAW
45 S
exe ngredients from VAT).   
atment of the Sales of Goods Under VAT in the European Union and Sales Tax in the United States, 62 TAX 
. 1055, 1060 n.16 (2009). 
ee Council Directive 2006/112, art. 93, ann. III, 2006 O.J. (L. 347) 1 (EC) (authorizing EU member states to 
mpt food and food i
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some also exempted taxpayers below a certain income threshold from any VAT liability.46  
Canada currently issues VAT rebates to low-income families.    
ions of these 
mitigation
dis
wo 48
consumption tax could putatively avoid regressivity problems, such as through a payroll-tax 
rebate and refundable income tax credit, although Yin is skeptical that these proposals are worth 
pu
an
reb
47
 Proponents of new major consumption taxes offer more sophisticated vers
 efforts.  Michael Graetz argues in favor of a U.S. VAT, and proposes to render it 
tributionally neutral by reducing Social Security payroll tax withholding for low-income 
rkers.   George Yin has also described other methods for assuring that a cash-flow 
rsuing.49  And proponents of the so-called “fair tax” urge the U.S. to adopt a national sales tax, 
d claim that they can balance out any resulting unfairness either through an annual payroll tax 
ate or through a “prebate” to poor households.50 
                                                 
illiam J. Turnier, Designing an Efficient Value Added Tax, 39 TAX. L. EV46 W R . 435, 438--40 (1983).  Hall and 
Rabushka’s “flat tax” takes a VAT-like approach in exempting some income from any tax; for a family of four, they 
suggest the first $25,500 in earnings would be untaxed.  ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX vii, 
59 (2d ed. 1995). 
47 Robert E. Hall, Toward Fundamental Tax Reform, in GUIDELINES FOR TAX REFORM: THE SIMPLE, PROGRESSIVE 
VALUE-ADDED CONSUMPTION TAX 73--74 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds., 2005). 
48 Id. at 290--91; see also Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look 
at P
des
 
add
the tem, see Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Social Security Work, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 149-
-55
49 Y
50 P
(pr
Na
htt
rogressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1908 & n.5 (1987) (explaining use of “demogrants” to achieve 
irable level of progressivity in tax system with regressive rates). 
The payroll tax is a flat 7.5% assize on the first $95,000 of salary received by the employee, plus an 
itional 7.5% tax on each dollar of salary paid by the employer.  T.C. §§ 3101, 3111.  For a helpful overview of 
 social security tax sys
 (2004). 
in, supra note , at 466--90.  
aul Bachman et al., Taxing Sales Under the Fair Tax: What Rate Works?, TAX NOTES 663, 668 (Nov. 13, 2006) 
ebate); David R. Burton & Dan R. Mastromarco, Emancipating American From the Income Tax: How the 
tional Sales Tax Would Work  nn.41--42, Cato Policy Analysis No. 272, available at 
p://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-272.html (rebate). 
  Many carbon tax or cap-and-trade proposals contain similar features.51  In the most basic 
model, each individual taxpayer would simply receive a lump-sum tax rebate consisting of some 
fra
so
sec
em 54
propose rebating the full 15% to workers, but capping the rebate at about $560.55  Alternatively, 
Metcalf has suggested in his own work that low-wage earners might get a credit against their 
fed
wo ally neutral.57  Because the rebate is capped, it will have much larger 
proportio 58
disproportionate burden of their cap and tr e regime.59  
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ction of the total revenue brought in by the carbon tax.52  Metcalf and Weisbach suggest a 
mewhat more complex scheme, in which each worker will receive a rebate on her social 
urity tax.53  In practice the employer-side tax is paid mostly by the worker, since the 
ployer reduces salary in order to account for the cost of the tax.   Metcalf and Weisbach 
eral income tax.56  
 According to Metcalf and Weisbach, their rebate plan helps to assure that carbon taxes 
uld be distribution
nal value to low-income households.   This disproportionate benefit aims to offset the 
ad
                                                 
 cap-and-trade mechanism can be designed to be economically equivalent to a carbon tax.  Ekins & Barker, 
 note 15, at 79--80.  A carbon tax imposed on energy producers usually consists
bon emitted by the producer.  Under cap and trade, energy producers must acquire 
51  A
supra  of a set price per unit of 
car a permit in order to produce 
each unit of carbon.  Since there are a limited number of permits available, if permits are tradeable, the market will 
determine a price for each unit of carbon.  Dinan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 203.  The government can set the 
number of available permits so that at equilibrium the market price per unit will be the same as it would be under a 
direct carbon tax.  Super, supra note 5, at 8.  That said, there are design differences between the two models, see 
Metcal
per
52 S
stil
tax
mo
53 M
54 J
Gru
55 M
56 G
57 M
58 M
59 M
eff
f, supra note 4, at 22--27 (arguing that a carbon tax is superior to cap and trade), but these differences are not 
tinent to our discussion. 
ee Metcalf, supra note 4, at 18 (modeling but not endorsing this approach).  Despite the rebate, consumers would 
l have incentives to reduce their use of carbon-intensive products.  Since everyone receives the same rebate, but 
es depend on carbon usage, households that do a better job reducing their carbon footprint will end the year with 
re money.  Shammin & Bullard, supra note 2, at 2437.   
etcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 513--14 & n.66 (citing Metcalf, supra note 4, at 14). 
ohn A. Brittain, The Incidence of Social Security Payroll Taxes, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 110, 111 (1971); Jonathan 
ber, The Incidence of Payroll Taxes: Evidence from Chile, 15 J. LABOR ECON. S72, S78-79, S99 (1997).  
etcalf, supra note 4, at 14. 
ilbert Metcalf, A Distributional Analysis of Green Tax Reforms, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 655, 663 (1999). 
etcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 516; Metcalf, supra note 4, at 16. 
etcalf, supra note 4, at 16. 
etcalf, supra note 4, at 16; see also Dinan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 213 Tbl.6 (estimating distributional 
ects of various rebate models); Dallas Burtraw et al., The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy, Resources for the 
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 will have a standard of living of a family with net income of $900, meaning that they 
ll have a small home, eat only essentials, and skimp on other expenses.  In the rebate month, 
y must consume $2,100 worth of goods, meaning that they will have to purchase many things 
which they assign relatively low utility -- true luxuries.
 
Many forms of consumption tax, then, recognize the dangers of regressivity, and make 
some efforts to eliminate them.  In many cases, the safeguard mechanism is some form of annual 
re
am
tance of Income Smoothing 
 A tributionally neutral 
consumption taxes is that they assume households are capable of perfectly smoothing their 
incomes o
mo
of 
full w
monthly consumption tax costs, and a $1,200 rebate check.  For eleven months of the year, the 
household
wi
the
to 
req
The extra $100 could be devoted to high-utility recurring expenses, such as food and rent.   
bate.  As we will now argue, however, the timing of rebates may matter as much as their 
ount.       
 C. Impor
n important, albeit implicit, caveat to claims of many dis
ver time.  That is, they presume that money received in one lump can be spread out 
re evenly through borrowing or saving.  Again, where there is a diminishing marginal utility 
wealth, both borrowing and saving are critical to maximizing each person’s utility. 
 To take an admittedly extreme example, suppose that rebate checks must be consumed in 
ithin a month of receipt.  Now take a household with $1,000 in monthly income, $100 in 
60  In the absence of the spending 
uirement, the family could instead live at a $1,000 per month standard of living year-round.  
                                                                                                                                                             
ld be distributionally neutral, but finding that payroll tax rebate might not). 
f course, it is possible that the family could pre-pay their rent, or purchase some durable goods, and in that way 
t let us rule out durable-goods purchases to be true to the spirit of our hypothetical.      
Future Discussion Paper  No. 09-17-Rev, at 2, 19 (June 2009) (projecting that several versions of a carbon tax rebate 
cou
60 O
improve their standard of living for subsequent months.  Purchase of durable goods, in effect, is a form of savings.  
Bu
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Thus, the time-limited rebate, although apparently distributionally neutral, in fact reduces 
the welfare of recipient households.  Households that cannot smooth their rebate over the year 
wi
wh
th
conditions in the real world that result in imperfect household income smoothing.  For a family 
of modest means, being poor for 364 days and rich for one is often not the same as being middle-
cla
tw
II. IQUIDITY ONSTRAINTS  IDDEN AXES  AND EBATES IN IME
C OUSEHOLDS 
In this Part we begin our analysis of  the effects of rebate timing on household welfare.  A 
sin
co r rebate date.  Alternately, the reader can 
conceive 
ca
wh
taxpayers who treat the first year of the tax as a pure loss.  We call the beginning of the year 
payment a “prebate.”   
on 
be
ll lose utility relative to those that can, with the size of the loss depending on the degree to 
ich the marginal utility of wealth diminishes for that household --- how much more well-being 
e family gets from safer housing and nutrition, say, than from going to the movies.   
 While obviously no one is proposing to enact a time-limited rebate, there are many 
ss for the whole year.  We explore some of the sources of imperfect smoothing over the next 
o Parts.        
L C , H T , R T -
ONSISTENT H
gle annual rebate can be modeled as occurring either before or after the year’s consumption, 
rresponding to a beginning-of-year or end-of-yea
of the two models both as representing Dec. 31 rebates, but the end-of-year model 
ptures what happens in the first year of the tax (if the tax is effective Jan. 1 of the same year), 
ile the beginning-of-year model represents what would occur in subsequent years for 
 The central problem with the rebate, we argue, is that households may not be able to draw 
the wealth it represents until the date they actually receive it.  For example, households may 
 unable to borrow as much as they would prefer, or may fail to realize their need or ability to 
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 ways, each of these different interpretations likely imply that on net low-income 
ows that poorer households are liquidity constrained --- they cannot borrow effectively.
borrow until after they have been hit by unexpectedly high consumption costs.  In these 
situations, the year-end increase in wealth may fail to offset the lost welfare the household 
ex
pr
to 
table across time.  That 
seems like a simple assumption, but in fact it is contrary to much recent evidence.61  In Part III 
we revisit our analysis with the assumption of time-consistency relaxed.     
 A.  Liquidity Constraints and Time Discounting 
 Recent studies of spending by poor households suggest very strongly that a year-end 
rebate wi  be interpreted 
in several
families will lose welfare under a “distributionally neutral” rebate scheme.  First, the evidence 
sh
Ev
im
alt
smooth 64
this is a valid preference that policy analysts ought to include in their calculation of welfare, the 
inabi
periences during the year.  These same problems arise when the lump sum is converted to a 
ebate: taxpayers still face costly or unavailable mechanisms for moving money from one time 
another, and must be cognizant of their need to do so.   
Throughout this Part, we assume that households’ preferences are s
ll not adequately compensate those households.  While these studies can
62  
en where individuals were able to borrow, they often paid remarkably high interest rates, 
plying that the opportunity to smooth income had very high welfare benefits.63  Second, and 
ernatively, willingness to pay high borrowing costs might be evidence not of the gains from 
ing but simply of impatience --- a desire to consumer sooner rather than later.   But, if 
lity to satisfy this impatience would be a strike against a year-end rebate. 
                                                 
ee infra Part II.A.1. 
ee infra Part II.A.2. 
havior? Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 Q.J. ECON. 149, 179--80 (2002). 
61 See infra text accompanying notes 160--174. 
62 S
63 S
64 David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer 
Be
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 1.  Evidence of Liquidity Constraints 
 Although it seems an intuitive point that the very poor cannot easily borrow, in fact it is 
theoretica
me
po
fut
capital and motivate borrowers to make full use of it to repay.65  Additionally, households may 
have sources of fiscal and other support that do not show up on their balance sheets, such as 
pa
Th
wo
households are severely liquidity constrained, to the point where they could not easily borrow the 
hundreds of dollars represented by a consumption tax rebate.67  A key set of data is a series of 
studies sh
the
lly ambiguous how severely any borrowing constraint would bind.  For one, as we 
ntioned in Part I.A., some individuals who are poor now may not be in the future, and might 
tentially borrow against “human capital”  --- their ability to bring in additional revenues in the 
ure.  Whether this prospect is realistic depends on how effectively lenders can discern human 
rents and children outside the home, friends, neighbors, or simply the kindness of strangers.66  
us, it is useful to have evidence on whether these kinds of alternatives are important in the real 
rld. 
 While the empirics do not rule out these factors for some, they do show that many 
owing consumer responses to a predictable, one-time future spike in income, usually in 
 form of a tax rebate.68  For a consumer who could borrow, and expected no other fluctuations 
                                                 
ullio Japelli et al., Testing for Liquidity Constraints in Euler Equations with Complementary Data Sources, REV. 
ON. & STATS. 251, 252 (1998); Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference 
EX   EV
employment: Unsecured Debt as a Safety Net, 43 J. HUM. RES. 383, [12] n.21 (2008). 
vid S. Johnson et al., The Respon Consumer Spending to Rebates During an Expansion: Evidence from the 
65 See GRUBER, supra note 20, at 288 (describing obstacles to borrowing against future earnings potential). 
66 T
EC
Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 T . L. R . 451, 460 (2008); James X. Sullivan, Borrowing During 
Un
67 Da se of 
2003 Child Tax Credit 2 (unpublished manuscript, Apr. 2009).  Until relatively recently, studies of liquidity 
constraints were largely inconclusive, owing to problems in the available data and difficulties in sorting cause from 
effect.  See Browning & Lusardi, supra note 30, at  1833--34 (critiquing earlier studies on these grounds); Angela C. 
Ly
(20
EC
68 S
Cr
Inc
ons, How Credit Access Has Changed Over Time for U.S. Households, 37 J. CONSUMER AFF. 231, 232--33 
03) (same); Nicholas S. Souleles, The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Refunds, 89 AM. 
ON. REV. 947, 947--48 (1999) (same). 
umit Agarwal et al., The Reaction of Consumer Spending and Debt to Tax Rebates --- Evidence from Consumer 
edit Data, 115 J. POL. ECON. 986, 987--88 (2007); David S. Johnson et al., Household Expenditures and the 
ome Tax Rebates of 2001, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1589, 1590 (2006); Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel Slemrod, 
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in income, the rational behavior would be to smooth that spike across time --- to borrow in order 
to spend some of it before the rebate, and save to spend some after.   Strikingly, many 
co c
of 
pro
wh 72
who did not expect the income were most likely not to spend it in advance.73 
Similar recent investigations found a strong relationship between the timing of income tax 
ref suggest that 
the key b
69
nsumers did not much increase spending before the spike, and then spent a signifi ant chunk 
their rebate in the few months afterwards.70  In most studies, that pattern was most 
nounced for households with low incomes and low wealth.71  The pattern held true for those 
o confirmed that they in fact anticipated the income spike,  although unsurprisingly those 
unds or minimum wage hikes and the ability to take out auto loans.74  The authors 
arrier to credit for some households is a down-payment, often quite modest, that lenders 
                                                                                                                                                             
athan Parker, The Impact of the 2008 Tax Rebates on Consumer Spending: Preliminary Evidence 1--2 
published manuscript, July 29, 2008); Shawn Cole et al., Where Does it Go? Spending by the Financially 
Response to Tax Rebates, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 381 (2003); Souleles, supra note 67, at 947; Christian Broda & 
Jon
(un
Constrained, Harvard University Joint Center for Housing Studies Paper No. UCC08-3, at 1 (Apr. 14, 2008); Julia 
Lynn Coronado et al., The Household Spending Response to the 2003 Tax Cut: Evidence from Survey Data 1 
(unpublished manuscript July 25, 2005); Claudia Sahm et al., Household Response to the 2008 Tax Rebates: Survey 
Ev
69 J
sup
70 J
-10
71 J
3; C
68, 
com
Sahm
Sh ng off debt far exceeded either spending or saving for all categories of 
res
inc
the
deb
obs
eve
to b
to u
nee
72 C
73 I
74 W
49,
idence and Aggregate Implications 1 (unpublished manuscript, Aug. 27, 2009). 
ohnson et al., supra note 68, at 1595.  In some situations this prediction is not as robust.  Browning & Lusardi, 
ra note 30, at 1801.   
ohnson et al., supra note 68, at 1597--99; Broda & Parker, supra note 68, at 3; Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 9-
, 14; Sahm et al., supra note 68, at 6, 15. 
ohnson et al., supra note 68, at 1603--04; Souleles, supra note 67, at 953, 956; Broda & Parker, supra note 68, at 
oronado et al., supra note 68, at 12; Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 14.  But see Shapiro & Slemrod, supra note 
at 385 (finding that poorer households were less likely to spend rebate than others).  Sahm et al. find a more 
plex pattern in which poorer households spent faster but over time spent less of their rebate than the richest.  
 et al., supra note 68, at 7, 10--11.  The contrary results may be explainable as an aspect of debt burdens.  
apiro and Slemrod find that payi
pondents.  Shapiro & Slemrod, supra note 68, at 385 tbl.2.  Paying off debt may be more important for low-
ome households.  Since these households have difficulty saving, maintaining an open line of credit is vital to 
m in surviving future crises.  ANGUS DEATON, UNDERSTANDING CONSUMPTION 197 (1992).  Thus, paying off 
t is a form of saving for future liquidity needs.  Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 14 n.19 (arguing that some 
erved data can also be explained by fact that poor households need to accumulate “buffer stock” of savings in the 
nt of future crises).  This story implies that debt repayment is itself evidence that households expect themselves 
e liquidity constrained in the future.  Cf. Gross & Souleles, supra note 64, at 153 (arguing that borrowers’ refusal 
se all of their credit limit is evidence of liquidity constraint where it is motivated by fear that credit will be 
ded more urgently in future).           
oronado et al., supra note 68, at 1. 
d. 
illiam Adams et al., Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
 56--58 (2009). 
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demand as security for the loan.75  The tax refund is a large enough lump to overcome the down-
payment problem, greatly facilitating borrowing for major purchases.    
e
suggestiv
ex
be 79
that households cannot borrow infinitely against future income, but instead are constrained by 
their ability to make current payments.    
sm ny households that cannot easily borrow 
all they w
a s 82
 
76
 In another study of auto loans, a separate set of authors found different evidenc  
e of liquidity constraints.77  In that case, lower-income buyers paid premiums for 
tending their loans over a longer period of time.78  The inference is that what drives borrowing 
havior for those families is the ability to make monthly loan-service payments.   That implies 
80
 Finally, yet other research documents the use and availability of credit cards for income 
oothing.  In general, evidence here again shows ma
ould prefer.81  For instance, when credit limits increase, so does the carried balance for 
ignificant number of cardholders.   But we view this results as offering only limited support 
                                                 
dams et al., supra note Error! ookmark not defined., at 57, 63; see also Daniel Aaronson et al., The 
p://www.chicagofed.org/economists/EricFrench.cfm/ (finding that increases in minimum wage rate allow 
olds to buy goods requiring down payments). 
75 A B
Consumption Response to Minimum Wage Hikes 2--3, 23--26 (unpublished manuscript, Sept. 18, 2008), available at 
htt
househ
76 Adams et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 56--57.  An average tax refund represents about 6.5 
weeks of net income for a low-income family.  Cole et al., supra note 68, at 1.  Additional evidence on the 
importance of rebates to overcoming the down-payment problem includes Souleles, supra note 67, at 954, and 
Da
EC
but
77 O
on 
78 I
79 I
80 I
sup
81 A
arg
fee s indicate that borrowers lack “lower-cost credit 
alte
MO
Gro use, finding borrowing increases together 
wit ns, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 248--49; Sullivan, supra note 66, at [20-
-24  link spending patterns with periods of unemployment). 
82 G
vid W. Wilcox, Social Security Benefits, Consumption Expenditures, and the Life Cycle Hypothesis, 97 J. POL. 
ON. 288, 288--304 (1989) (finding that actual receipt of higher social security benefits increases auto purchases, 
 announcement of benefits increase does not). 
razio P. Attanasio et al., Credit Constraints in the Market for Consumer Durables: Evidence from Micro-Data 
Car Loans, 49 INT’L ECON. REV. 401, 402--04 (2008). 
d. at 404. 
d. at 406, 427. 
d. at 433.  For additional evidence that monthly payment requirements limit borrowing, see Gross & Souleles, 
ra note 64, at 168. 
garwal et al., supra note 68, at 1005--10 (describing effects of rebate on low-limit credit card holders, and 
uing they represent “binding liquidity constraints”); Cole et al., supra note 68, at 10--11 (suggesting that high 
s paid by taxpayers to accelerate their refunds by a few week
rnatives”); Donald Cox & Tullio Japelli, The Effect of Borrowing Constraints on Consumer Liabilities, 25 J. 
NEY, CREDIT & BANKING 197, 198 (1993) (employing survey to identify borrowers who were denied credit); 
 note 64, at 151--52 (using data set of credit card ss & Souleles, supra
mit increases)h li ; Lyo
] (using survey data to
ross & Souleles, supra note 64, at 164; Lyons, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 249. 
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for the notion that households are credit constrained in general, rather than simply showing that 
they are constrained from using credit cards.  The studies do not generally observe others forms 
of
lea
co
hese results as evincing significant liquidity 
constraints among poorer households.84  If households do not smooth their income, it is most 
likely because they cannot --- although there may also be a complicated story here about 
im u
po  on those who are 
entitled to
households, or to households with “qualifying” income of at least $3,000.85  Thus retirees with 
little social security income  and individuals with disabilities, to take possible groups, may be 
too
 
 household debt,83 so credit balances, or inability to obtain a card or a higher limit, might still 
ve a household with other credit alternatives, albeit perhaps alternatives that are less 
nvenient or more expensive.    
 Overall, most economists interpret t
patience and self-restraint, which we will set o t shortly.   
 One point worth emphasizing about existing research is that it fails to examine the very 
orest households.  Studies of tax rebates by definition can collect data only
 a rebate; for example in one experiment, the rebate was only available to working 
86
 poor to even appear in the research.  And car loans and credit cards are usually totally 
                                                 
eorge-Marios Angeletos et al., The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical 
aluation, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 47, 62--64 (2001); Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, What Do High-
 (Jan. 2009); Jeffrey R. Campbell & Zvi Hercowitz, Liquidity Constraints of the Middle Class, Federal Reserve 
nk of Chicago Working Paper No. WP-09-20, at 16 (Dec. 2008), available at 
83 E.g., Gross & Souleles, supra note 64, at 159. 
84 G
Ev
Interest Borrowers Do With Their Tax Rebate?, Chicago Booth Initiative on Global Markets Working Paper No. 29, 
at 1
Ba
http://www.sabanciuniv.edu/HaberlerDuyurular/Documents/DD20081030044837/zvi_LiquidityConstraintsDec08.p
df.  For yet other evidence of liquidity constraints in addition to what we have summarized here, see David Card et 
al., havior: New Evidence from the Labor Market, Q. J. 
EC
con
85 S
hou
at 4
86 I
targ
PU
ben
 Cash-on-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Be
ON. 1511, 1553 (2007).    
The data also suggest that black households and those headed by unmarried women are especially 
strained.  Lyons, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 241. 
ahm et al., supra note 68, at 1; see also Agarwal et al., supra note 68, at 987 n.1 (noting that about 23 million 
seholds did not file an income tax return and so were not covered by their study); Johnson et al., supra note 67, 
 n.7 (acknowledging that credit they study flows mostly to families making in excess of $20 thousand). 
n order to qualify for social security benefits, an individual must have met certain salary and years-worked 
ets, or been married to another individual who did so.  See Social Security Retirement Benefits, SSA 
BLICATION NO. 05-10035 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/1035.pdf (discussing social security 
efit eligibility requirements). 
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unavailable to the very poor.87  Theory suggests these kinds of households would be even more 
liquidity constrained,  but we don’t have any data to confirm that.     
 2.  Borrowing Against the Rebate 
 It  often liquidity-constrained as a 
general mat
claim would be that even the least credit-worthy household should be able to borrow against 
their expected rebate.  This has not proven true empirically, however.  Further, theory suggests 
that 
ho
co Again, most of the studies we 
mention e amine 89
But those studies found incomplete income smoothing, particularly among poorer households.   
Intuitiv
fai
tha
a t
liquidity constraints remained an obstacle despite the certain influx of income.92  There are a 
num
 
88
might be argued that, although poorer families are
ter, this problem should disappear when there is a year-end distribution.  That is, the 
intermediaries will capture at least some of the value of borrowing for highly-constrained 
useholds, and the available data bear this out.  
 The same studies that suggest liquidity constraints generally also demonstrate  that 
nsumers cannot easily borrow even against a certain rebate.  
x exactly the situation in which the taxpayer was certain to receive her rebate.   
90
ely, we might expect that some failure to borrow might result from the household’s 
lure to recognize that the rebate is coming.  One study offers some support for that, finding 
t income-tax rebates were a genuine surprise to more than a quarter of households, and about 
hird of households in the case of a payroll tax rebate.91   
Even well-informed families often failed to smooth their rebates, however, suggesting that 
ber of possible causes for this problem.  Some individuals might remain poor credit risks 
                                                 
ittwin, supra note 66, at 463. 87 L
88 Shapiro & Slemrod, supra note 68, at 385.   
89 Johnson 
90 Johnson et
91 C
92 C
et al., supra note 68, at 1592; Sahm et al., supra note 68, at 2. 
 al., supra note 68, at 1603; Sahm et al., supra note 68, at 6--7. 
oronado et al., supra note 68, at 11. 
oronado et al., supra note 68, at 13--14. 
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despite a guarantee of income: for example, those that could file for bankruptcy, or that might 
quickly spend their rebate proceeds and render themselves effectively judgment-proof.  Others 
m
th
to
pa 94
prohibitively high for small loans.95  Thus, since so much of the likelihood of these kinds of risks 
will remain known only to the borrower, market failure due to information asymmetry is likely.  
c
mu
asymmetr
wo 97
is strictly accurate only at the margin.  Where there are enough infra-marginal high-quality 
                                                
 
ight commit the same funds to multiple creditors, or prove to have more urgent expenses when 
eir check arrives.93  Persons who work only part-time or temporary jobs might also be thought 
 be risks to relocate, incurring more costs in collection than the value of any interest 
yments.   Lenders face high fixed costs of verifying all this information, costs that may be 
96
In some situations, theory would predi t that the lending market would not fail, but that 
ch of the value of borrowing would be captured by lenders.  The standard information 
y story assumes that only “low quality” customers --- in borrowing, the riskiest --- 
uld accept the unfavorable rates offered by the uninformed counter-party.   But that analysis 
 
93 C
Predatory Payday Lending 3 (2004), available at http:// 
www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf (finding that payday borrowers often fail to 
repay when paycheck arrives because they must instead pay “basic living expenses, such as electricity, rent, and 
groceries”). 
94  Julia J. Bartkowiak, Trends Toward Part-Time Employment: Ethical Issues, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 811, 812 (1993); 
cf. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 146 (2004) (noting that transient workers and 
undocumented immigrants have difficulty opening bank accounts). 
95 R
94,
loa
96 W
PR
fro eriment 3, 14--15 (unpublished manuscript), available at 
htt
“m
the
mo er bo
97 J
39
f. Keith Ernst, John Farris & Uriah King, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Quantifying the Economic Cost of 
onald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 864--65 (2007); see Barr, supra note 
 at 155 (explaining that high fees for fringe lenders are associated in part with costs of origination, follow-up, and 
n losses). 
illiam H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, LAW & CONTEMP. 
OBS. , Autumn 1977, at 13, 24--27; Sumit Agarwal et al., Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market: Evidence 
m a Natural Exp
p://ushakrisna.com/CreditCardAdvSelection.pdf.  That is, borrowing by low-asset individuals often produces a 
arket for lemons.”  Without knowing the riskiness of a borrower, rational lenders will not offer rates that any but 
 riskiest borrowers would accept.  Since these are the only customers the lender attracts, she ends up losing 
y on many of her loans, leading her to charge yet higher rates, leading to yet risne ki rrowers, and so on.    
oseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 
3, 403 (1981); Agarwal et al., supra note 96, at 3. 
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customers,98 lenders should be able to find a market without driving up their own costs above 
price.   The new equilibrium point will fall at an interest rate that looks unfair --- a price no 
co y
mu
it i
ices to different portions of the market, it can 
profit on risky loans without driving away other customers.100  Modern finance now apparently 
allows lenders to separate borrowers into pools, if not to identify the riskiness of any particular 
cre iv
be
ris
po 103
looser legal price-control regime, permits lenders to set two tiers of prices, so that they can 
charge high rates from high-demand high-risk borrowers without driving away the pool of safe 
99
mparabl  risky marginal borrower would stomach.  Ordinarily, this possibility would not be of 
ch use to the lender, as the costs of driving away customers closer to the margin would make 
mpractical to price at this high level. 
If, however, the lender can charge separate pr
dit applicant.101 For example, the rise of credit reporting agencies has d ided consumers 
tween those with established credit histories and those without.102  Lenders can identify the 
kiness of those with credit histories, while those without---generally, those who are young, 
or, or both---remain unknowable and presumptively risky.   This bifurcation, together with a 
                                                 
nfra-marginal purchasers are those who are willing to pay  more than the equilibrium price for a good, because 98 I
they value it more than the customer who values it least (the marginal customer).  MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra 
note , at 284.   
99 That is, although there remain “lemons” in the market, if infra-marginal demand is high enough, the high-demand 
high-quality borrowers may be profitable enough to overcome losses from low-quality borrowers.  See Richard 
R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 998 (2006) (stating that lending to “fringe” customers is 
made possible by cross-subsidy from safe but unknown customers to risky borrowers).       
100 See, e.g., Adams et al., supra note 74, at 66--68 (demonstrating that lenders can break even in the presence of 
asy
diff
101
102 Y, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 84--110 (1994) 
(tra
103 
Mi
Bo
sig
mmetric information by offering contracts that force borrowers to reveal their own riskiness, such as through 
erent tiers of down-payments).   
 Mann & Hawkins, supra note 95, at 911. 
See JOHN P. CASKE
cing rise in business of lending to the poor); Brooks, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 997--1002. 
Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the 
sguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1508--14 (2006); Brooks, supra note Error! 
okmark not defined., at 997, 1012; see Adams et al., supra note 74, at 82 (“modern credit scoring can go a 
nificant distance toward mitigating adverse selection problems”). 
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bets. 104  Market concentration among lenders, and cognitive or informational challenges to 
price-shopping among borrowers, would also help to keep borrowing costs high.  
v
these very
inc
sm
many potential borrowers willing to pay very high rates of interest.106  For very high demanders, 
that price may still increase utility.   However, the utility those borrowers receive will be much 
sm --
of 
                                                
105
If borrowers are fully rational, the diminishing marginal utility of wealth might make e en 
 high-interest loans welfare-increasing, albeit only narrowly.  Because the value of 
ome smoothing is so high at the extreme low end of the income distribution --- where 
oothing means survival or not, homelessness or not --- it makes sense that there would be 
107
aller than what they would have had they been able to borrow at a “market” rate - the price 
funds available to those for whom it is easier for the lender to verify credit-worthiness.  In 
 
104  See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 103, at 1488, 1516--17 (observing that innovations in fringe lending 
practices allow lenders to charge prices that “would have been viewed as usurious” in an earlier era); Mann & 
Hawkins, supra note 95, at 889 (explaining that key development allowing bifurcation of loan market was legal 
change allowing very high rates).  
105 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (arguing that 
consumers’ “imperfect rationality” reduces price competition among lenders); Brooks, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 1010 (noting that conventional lenders avoid fringe market, reducing competition for 
sm
expl
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rat
all lenders); Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 103, at 1525--58 (arguing that cognitive failures allow lenders to 
oit low-income borrowers).  But see Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Subprime 
rtgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1083 (2009) (arguing that increased competition might actually 
rease efforts to mislead borrowers).   
 Cf. Littwin, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 457--58 (explaining importance of credit in allowing 
-income families to cope with and even survive crises, and noting that “[t]iming is especially crucial for low-
ome families”); Bertrand & Morse, supra note 84, at 2, 10 (finding that certain payday borrowers use funds to 
oid … having the gas connection turned off or to catch up with late rent payments” and “buying groceries”).  We 
 also sympathetic to claims that many borrowers are not acting rationally at all, but instead are making serious 
stakes that reduce their own subjective well-being.  E.g., Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 103, at 1489--90.  
rkets may contain a mix of rational and irrational actors.  Bar-Gill, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
1123--24.  Indeed, we believe that mistaken borrowing can be a serious problem for tax rebates, as we elaborate 
ra Part III.G.  For now our only point is that, even if all borrowers are fully rational, there is still a strong basis for 
v ment intervention.     ern
See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 95, at 885 (suggesting that some borrowers who pay high fees are acting 
ionally, and use funds to “purchase food or medicine”).   
 25
 
effect, the lender expropriates what would have been the borrower’s consumer surplus had there 
not been market failure.    
r  for these infra-marginal borrowers means that borrowers 
give up h
am
ea
amounts at relatively little cost in absolute dollars. 
Other research confirms this story: there is in fact a market for loans to very poor 
bo rn preparers will offer 
customer
fee
ea
although prices have come down slightly in the past few years.111  Similarly, so-called “payday 
lenders” will advance money to borrowers on the condition that the borrower allows the lender to 
au
mo
Ot
108
Thus, allowing lenders to p ice
uge utility in order to enrich the shareholders of lenders by a comparatively nominal 
ount.  As we will describe in Part IV.B., infra, government interventions that made borrowing 
sier for these kinds of poor households would therefore increase social welfare by large 
rrowers, but only at exorbitant interest rates.109  Many tax-retu
s entitled to a tax refund expedited access to the funds in exchange for several small 
s, each in the range of $30 to $135.110  Since the client only receives their money a few weeks 
rly, the effective annual rate of interest paid on these loans averages between 150 and 300%, 
tomatically debit his account on the date of his next paycheck.112  Here, too, nominal fees are 
dest, but over the course of a year translate to effective interest rates of 300% or higher.113  
her forms of credit, such as pawnshop loans, can carry effective rates as high as 1000%.114  In 
                                                 
Cf. Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Slight of Hand: Salience Distortions in 
fitable.”).   
Bertrand & Morse, supra note 84, at 1. 
108 
American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1126--27 (2008) (“[P]ayday lending has proven wildly 
pro
109 
110 National Consumer Law Center, Inc., Chi Chi Wu & Jean Ann Fox, Coming Down: Fewer Refund Anticipation 
Loans, Lower Prices from Some Providers, But Quickie Tax Refunds Loans Still Burden the Poor, at 8--11 (March 
2008); Barr, supra note 94, at 166--68. 
111 National Consumer Law Center, Inc., supra note 110, at 4, 10--12; Barr, supra note 94, at 168--70. 
112 Barr, supra note 94, at 149, 153.  For an overview of the industry, see CASKEY, supra note 102, at 36--68. 
113 Barr, supra note 94, at 154--55. 
114 Mann & Hawkins, supra note 95, at 891. 
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one study, the receipt of a tax rebate reduced taxpayers’ use of these other forms of borrowing, 
strongly implying that no other, cheaper sources of credit were available for the household.     
3. Impatience 
 W  at this point that the evidence on liquidity constraints can also be 
interprete
to smooth an expected revenue spike might be the product not of externally-imposed limits on 
borrowing, but instead of deliberate choices to save.   At first glance, the savings story is hard 
to r
ma
reb
loo
ess
certain impatient households: families who struggle to save, and know it.  Those families might 
use th
to t
 
115
e must acknowledge
d to imply that year-end rebates would increase welfare for some households.  Failure 
116
econcile with data that households spent much of their rebate paying down debt,117 and that 
ny were willing to pay very high effective rates of interest to accelerate the receipt of the 
ate.118  The savings story also is puzzling for families that spent some of their rebate on what 
k like luxuries, such as vacations and apparel;119 it would be strange to defer consumption of 
entials in order to save for luxuries.  These odd behaviors, though, may be more sensible for 
e delayed tax rebate as a way of forcing themselves to overcome impatience.120  We return 
hese issues in Part III.    
                                                
115 Bertrand & Morse, supra note 84, at 1. 
116 Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 14 n.19 (noting that their data can also be interpreted as evidence of 
households deliberating choosing to accumulate a “buffer stock” against uncertain future outcomes); Fennell & 
Stark, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 19--20 (explaining that what look like “failures” to smooth 
may be the product of deliberate but unusual preferences). 
117 See sources cited supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
118 Cole et al., supra note 68, at 9--11. 
119 Bertrand & Morse, supra note 84, at 7--8; Broda & Parker, supra note 68, at 3--4. 
120 Angeletos et al., supra note 84, at 49; see Michael S. Barr & Jane K. Dokko, Paying to Save: Tax Withholding 
Among Low- and Moderate-Income Taxpayers 2--4 (unpublished manuscript, Aug. 2009) (considering this 
argument). 
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B.  Low Salience of Energy Costs 
 Another factor that may contribute to imperfect smoothing is households’ possible failure 
to recogn
be 
tig
compo
borrowing: for example, a taxpayer who does not know she will get a refund at the end of the 
year w
 1.  Welfare Costs of Hidden Taxes 
 In the classic household-budgeting model, families know how much each of their options 
costs whe 2  The model therefore assumes that 
within each time period families allocate their money first to the highest-priority items, and then 
to the next-highest, and so on, until the budget is exhausted.   That technique maximizes the 
fam
the
pri
 
ize the increased costs of a consumption tax.  Because consumption taxes are likely to 
relatively “low salience,” or “hidden,” families might be surprised by budgets that prove 
hter than expected, leaving less money available for top priorities.121  In addition to 
unding the budget woes of those who are liquidity constrained, salience also affects 
ill not think to borrow against it.      
n they decide how to divvy up their limited funds.12
123
ily’s welfare: every item purchased produces more utility than any item that was not.124   
 There is recent evidence, however, that consumers sometimes do not know the true prices 
y are paying.  Many marketing studies find that hiding part of the cost of a good in the fine 
nt, or breaking the price up into a number of smaller components, leads consumers to buy 
                                                 
r a review of the empirical evidence on whether transactional consumption taxes are more difficult for 
to detect, see Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 72--77 (2009). 
 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998) 
plaining rational planning model of economic behavior). 
121 Fo
shoppers 
122
(ex
123 See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice Theoretic Foundations for 
Behavioral Welfare Economics 23--24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13737, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1086986. 
124 Id. 
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more of the product.125  Since there is little reason to think that printing part of the price in six-
point font is a valuable aspect of a good, the implication is that consumers believe, erroneously, 
tha
mu
the
stu
for instance, in one study, people bought less of a good when the sales tax was computed for 
them and displayed on the shelf.     
we tentially interfere with a family’s budget-
allocation p
wi
somewhere else in the mo budget.  If the Ericssons do not notice the $10 gap until the end 
of the month, they may find themselves without enough money to pay rent or buy the last week’s 
gro
util
ex
which taxpayers know that a tax exists but consider the mental effort of computing it too 
                                                
 
t the price for the good is lower than its true total.  Similarly, some credit-card users pay too 
ch for credit relative to their peers, with those who are overpaying failing to notice some of 
 complex pricing rules governing the credit contract.126  Most directly on point for us, a few 
dies find similar outcomes when part of the price of a good or service is a hard-to-notice tax: 
127
 Hidden taxes and other low-salience costs may have a negative impact on household 
lfare.  Chetty et al. argue that hidden taxes po
rocess.128  Suppose the Ericsson family believes that heating their house this month 
ll cost $100, but after tax they ultimately pay $110.  That $10 shortfall must come from 
nthly 
ceries.  If so, they likely would have been better off putting on sweaters and paying a smaller 
ity bill.   
 One uncertainty here is that households may be aware of their own ignorance.  For 
ample, Chetty et al. hypothesize that hidden taxes may be the product of rational ignorance, in 
 
125 For surv
Surcharges
Krishna et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Price Presentation on Perceived Savings, 78 J. RETAILING 101, 
101
126 
(1991); Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 
Q.J
127 
128 Id. at [41--46]. 
eys of the evidence, see Vicki G. Morwitz et al., The Price Does Not Include Additional Taxes, Fees, and 
: A Review of Research on Partitioned Pricing 6--10 (unpublished manuscript, Feb. 26, 2009); Aradhna 
--18 (2002). 
Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 75--76 
. ECON. 353, 377--79 (2004). 
Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1145--46 (2009). 
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, newly-enacted taxes will throw off predictions.
 
burdensome to be worth their time.129  These kinds of taxpayers might have a sort of fudge factor 
when they allocate their household budget: they estimate that some costs will be higher, or the 
bu
be
ac
ory is to 
view the household budgeting method as targeting a rough standard of living, rather than a 
precise balance sheet.  Families might know from their prior shopping and living experiences the 
so
If 
pic
th
them.     
 Both of these descriptions of planning for hidden taxes assume, however, that taxpayers 
ca
bu ct, though, a variety of factors are likely to frustrate good predictions.  Most 
obviously
ac
world where their existing income purchased more goods.  Calculators will not accurately 
estimate new hidden taxes because, by definition, hidden taxes cannot be determined in advance: 
dget tighter, than projected.130  By leaving some of the budget unallocated, they could avoid 
ing caught short by hidden taxes.  We call these families “calculators.”  Whether anyone 
tually behaves this way is an empirical, and unanswered, question. 
 Another, less formal, way of capturing the intuition behind the Chetty et al. the
rts of things that they can generally afford --- we call these families “informed muddlers.”131  
these experiences include a consumption tax, then the family may have a fairly accurate 
ture of their own purchasing power, even if they are unaware that tax contributes to the cost of 
eir purchases.  In effect, the family has planned for hidden taxes, even if they are unaware of 
n predict with some degree of accuracy the total economic burden of hidden costs on their 
dgets.  In fa
132  Informed muddlers will not take 
count of new enactments when they shop, because their experiences have been formed in a 
                                                 
Id. at [42--44]. 
Cf. Browning & Lusardi, supra note 30, at 1846 (claiming that people may develop “rules of thumb” that allow 
Cf. Littwin, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 477--78 (describing how poor women learn 
hniques for managing tight finances, and noting these techniques are imperiled by rapid changes in household 
nce).  
129 Chetty et al., supra note 127, at [41--42]. 
130 
131 
them to approximate the correct decision even where they experience cognitive failures).  
132 
tec
fina
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they are either not worth the effort of calculating, or the family is incapable of calculating 
them.   Only time, and repeated experience paying hidden tax and retrospectively examining 
th ’s
ne
ca
inc 134
--- the family that buys its first car and begins to encounter gasoline taxes, for example.   
 It might be argued that the enactment of a major new consumption tax, such as a climate 
ch
highly sal
we
co
outlined: they must al recognize that the legislation means higher costs for them, and they must 
know how much.  The mere fact of enactment offers little on either front.   
133
e family  books, will provide the calculator household with enough information to account for 
w hidden taxes.  And, crucially, neither household will even be aware of the need to muddle or 
lculate unless they are aware of the facts of  the new tax’s enactment and its economic 
idence on them.   The same is true of changes in consumption from untaxed to taxed goods 
ange statute, will be a significant enough cultural event that the fact of its existence will be 
ient for most families.135  Having read several surveys of popular political awareness, 
 are dubious.136  But, even if the public is aware that a bill has passed, there are several more 
gnitive steps that each family must take to connect that fact with their own planning, as we just 
so 
137
                                                 
 benefit, or because people are totally unaware of the tax, or cannot perform the calculations.  All of these barrie
 equally present, if not more so, for the family that attempts to calculate hidden taxes in advance.  Galle, supra 
133 That is, taxes are hidden either because individuals rationally conclude that the effort of calculating them exceeds 
the rs 
are
note, at 85--89.     
134 “Incidence” is the economist’s term for the person bearing the actual economic burden of paying a tax.  GRUBER, 
supra note , at .  For instance, the legal duty to collect a sales tax falls on the seller, but in practice much of the cost 
of the tax is passed on to purchasers.  Thus, our argument is that, in order to plan for a new consumption tax, 
consumers must not only know that the new tax was passed but also realize that it will hit their own wallets.   
135 
136
Re
(fi
Be AME THEORY 315, 316 (2007) (reporting other studies of voter ignorance).  “Rational 
ign
vot
ign
137
go
tax
We are grateful to Gilbert Metcalf for making this point in response to our questions.   
 See Viktor J. Vanberg and James M. Buchanan, Constitutional Choice, Rational Ignorance, and the Limits of 
ason, in THE CONSTITUTION OF GOOD SOCIETIES 39, 43 (Karl Edward Stolton & Stephen Elkin eds., 1996) 
nding that voters are rationally ignorant of public policy); Cesear Martinelli, Rational Ignorance and Voting 
havior, 35 INT’L J. OF G
orance” refers to the fact that the cost of acquiring information is high while the voter perceives the effect of her 
e (given the low probability that her vote will be decisive) to be low.  As a result, many voters chose to remain 
orant and do not seek out information regarding the new rules or statutes.   
 Cf. Greenstein et al., supra note 11, at 7 (describing difficulties of informing low-income households about new 
vernment programs that are supposed to benefit them).  Empirical evidence that consumers are often surprised by 
 rebates also probably bears on this question; see supra t.a.n. 71--73. 
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pected future cost savings.  In particular, the family must know that the mysterious shortfall in 
eir monthly budget is attributable to energy costs, must calculate how much of the shortfall the 
estment would eliminate, and then discount that future savings to its present value.  Our claim 
out hidden taxes is that these kinds of calculations are either beyond the capacity of some 
st-effectiveness of her investments, as we explore in more detail in Part III.F. 
                                                
 Planning for budget shortfalls is also likely to be challenging in scenarios in which the 
size of the expected tax is very difficult to predict.  Studies suggest that many people cannot 
pr
Ca
am
of
household pays.  More generally, for any consumption tax, the resolution to save instead of 
spend allows a household to defer paying tax, giving them the benefit of the time value of the 
tax
wi
av  to encourage households 
to invest in energy-efficient appliances and lifestyles.139  In order to decide, however, whether to 
spend an extra $500 for new air conditioner, a family must have a fairly detailed sense of the 
ex
th
inv
ab
households, or are perceived not to be worth the mental effort of engaging in them.  There may 
also be a significant procrastination component to a taxpayer’s unwillingness to think about the 
co
edict accurately their own willpower, and instead overestimate their own future restraint.138  
rbon taxes (and their cap-and-trade equivalents) fall more heavily on households that use large 
ounts of carbon-intensive products.  Willpower --- the ability to put on a sweater, bike instead 
 driving, turn off the television --- will be a significant determinant of the amount of tax the 
es they save.  Consequently, if families are bad at predicting whether they will be able to exert 
llpower, they will also be unable to estimate their tax. 
 Finally on this point, both calculators and muddlers may struggle to make accurate tax-
oiding investment decisions.  One of the objectives of a carbon tax is
 
Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Self-Awareness and Self-Control, in TIME AND DECISION 217 (George 
on. 1209 (2003).  
Stephen H. Schneider and Lawrence H. Goulder, Achieving Low-Cost Emissions Targets, 389 NATURE 13, 13 
138 
Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003); George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J. 
Ec
139 
(1997). 
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 The hidden tax problem is more acute for the poorest families.  Theory and empirics to 
date are unclear on whether taxes are more hidden from rich or poor households.   But 
un
by 
ha
mo 141
  In sum, if consumption taxes are at least somewhat hidden from consumers, they may 
prevent some households from smoothing their incomes over the course of the year.  That is very 
likely to r
ca
los 142 e point of the pigouvian tax is to change behavior by impounding the negative 
consumption externality of a good into its price.143  But if consumers do not notice the tax they 
do not reduce their usage of the good; in the case of a carbon tax, they do not reduce carbon 
emissions. 
fam
go
                                                
140
expected costs are a greater danger to highly illiquid households; liquid households surprised 
their energy bill can always put the groceries on a credit card.  Wealthier households also 
ve a larger margin for error; when the family is already purchasing luxuries, an extra $100 per 
nth is easier to absorb out of lower-priority items.    
esult in greater welfare losses for households that cannot smooth than for those that 
n.   
 Additionally, as others have recognized, hidden pigouvian taxes lead to additional social 
s.   Th
 An estimated budget, such as Chetty et al. suggest, would not solve this problem; 
ilies would reduce spending, but not necessarily their consumption of carbon-intensive 
ods.       
 
140 Galle, supra note 121, at 100-104. 
141 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 105, at 64. 
142 Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969, 981--82 (2009). 
143 See supra note 16. 
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 2.  Learning 
 It might be argued in response to these points that hidden taxes are at worst a short-term 
problem, 
Al
dim
lend
likely that learning will be slow and partial, leaving many families vulnerable for extended 
periods. 
the et.145  Consumers who do not understand credit may also be unaware of their need 
to educate
the
the information-gathering efforts of others.146  Education by interested third-parties, such as 
consumer advocacy groups, may be difficult, in part because of these same factors, but also 
be
de
loa
fam 149
sufficiently, and might prefer not to in any event because they would rather also prey on the 
 
because households will quickly learn that their costs are higher than expected.144  
ternatively, liquidity-constrained households might learn to avoid the worst kinds of credit, 
inishing the extent to which the surplus from income smoothing would be diverted to 
ers.  While both of these are theoretically possible, based on available evidence it is more 
 Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren have explained why learning can be ineffective in 
 credit mark
 themselves, be unable to comprehend new information, might believe (wrongly) that 
 costs of effort of learning outweigh the benefits, or might expect that they can free-ride on 
cause of the highly differentiated nature of credit.147  Whether a loan is a good deal or not 
pends on how the household behaves, its tolerance for risk, and the exact features of the 
n.148  It is very hard for outsiders to gather this kind of information about millions of 
ilies.   Similarly, competitors would also struggle to educate potential customers 
                                                 
 Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 140--42 (2000) (making this argument 
ut credit card users). 
ill n, supra note 105, at 11--25; Bar-Gill, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1128--29. 
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 105, at 12--14. 
Id. at 14--17.  Additionally, peer-to-peer learning may be slowed by the self-interest of informed peers.  John Y. 
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 105, at 16, 24--25. 
Id. at 16.  Similarly, where individual factors are important families cannot easily learn just by observing others.  
144 See
abo
145 Bar-G  & Warre
146 
147 
Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1555, 1586--88 (2006). 
148 
149 
Browning & Lusardi, supra note 30, at 1846. 
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misinformed or fear that their rivals would capture any gains from education.150  Bar-Gill and 
Warren also round up empirical evidence to support their theory: learning in the credit market is 
slo
rning 
about hid
of 
and therefore these signals are “noisy,” but also due to our tendency to perceive evidence as 
confirming rather than disproving what we already believe.   The fact that taxes are and remain 
hid
hid
ov
 from rebates to prebates does not eliminate the difficulties we have just 
described.  Accelerating payment does somewhat change the nature of the problem, though.  For 
one thing, a pr instead of borrowing, the family 
now must
ge
and 
 
w, and people who do learn often forget their lessons over time.151   
 As one of us has also detailed elsewhere, many of these same factors apply to lea
den taxes.152  That earlier work additionally argues that taxpayers often fail to make use 
hints and clues about their own misjudgments, not only because household finance is complex 
153
den also seems to explain several features of our national tax system;154 if learning about 
den taxes were easy, it would be difficult to understand why these features have persisted 
er time. 
C.  Prebates Raise Similar Problems 
Switching
ebate may still require costly income smoothing: 
 save its money and use it to offset higher energy costs throughout the year.  More 
nerally, a lump-sum regime, whether in the form of a rebate or prebate, will fail to put poor 
wealthy households on the same footing, if the costs of smoothing consumption are greater 
                                                 
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 105, at 26--56.  For similar surveys of persistent household ignorance in personal 
ance decisions, see Campbell, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 157--85, 1588--89; Alexander L. 
Galle, supra note 121, at 89--93. 
Id. at 90. 
150 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 105, at 17--20. 
151 
fin
Brown et al., Learning and Visceral Temptation in Dynamic Saving Experiments, Q. J. ECON. 197, 200 (2009). 
152 
153 
154 Joel Slemrod, Old George Orwell Got it Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax Economics, CESifo 
Working Paper No. 2777, at 5--6 (Sept. 2009). 
 35
ion is neither cheap nor guaranteed.  Compared to their wealthier counterparts, poor 
                                                
 
for the poor.  This will hold whenever the poor have to pay more to borrow or save or are unable 
to do so. 
to smooth consumption in a prebate regime, poor households will have to have 
saving tec
ha
on
borrowing, the data still suggest that many poor households have no access to conventional 
banking.   Instead, they use risky or expensive substitutes, such as purchases of expensive 
du
ho aving decisions, a 
household
timely fashion.157  For instance, households may not realize that prebates are designed to offset 
increased energy costs.  They may then fail to save enough to cover those costs later, again 
res
D.  Summary 
tax .  To achieve distributional 
neutrality of welfare, and not simply of annual income, rebates and prebates must account not 
only for h en households spend.  But, as we have shown, smoothing 
consumpt
In order 
hnologies available that make it easy for them to save.  If these are not available or 
ve higher transaction costs than those available to wealthier households, then the poor will 
ce again be at a relative disadvantage.  Although evidence here is less extensive than in 
155
rable goods subject to theft, damage, or devaluation.156     
For similar reasons, the hidden nature of consumption tax regimes will also affect 
useholds who receive a prebate.  In order to make optimal consumption/s
 has to be able to incorporate information about the hidden tax regime, and do so in a 
ulting in budget “surprises” that reduce welfare. 
On the whole, it appears so far that many forms of transfers aimed at making consumption 
es more progressive are seriously flawed as presently designed
ow much but also wh
 
Barr, supra note 94, at 130--33; Sondra G. Beverly & Michael Sherraden, Institutional Determinants of Savings: 
Barr, supra note 94, at 123--24. 
See Chetty et al., supra note 127, at [41--46] (explaining household budgeting process under uncertainty about 
155 
Implications for Low-Income Households and Public Policy, 28 J. SOC. ECON. 4 (1999). 
156 
157 
tax rates). 
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159
ortcomings of lump-sum payout regimes identified in Part II become more pronounced once 
e allows for time-inconsistent households (“TI households”).  Time-inconsistency gets in the 
y of smoothing, leading households to save too little in a prebate regime, or to procrastinate 
rrowing against an expected rebate.  Moreover, the incentive to procrastinate will extend to 
out the impact of the tax and need to smooth consumption.  More generally, we also show that 
                                                
households pay more to borrow and get less when they save, a disadvantage exacerbated in turn 
by the hidden nature of a transactional consumption tax.       
III.  HYPERBOLIC HOUSEHOLDS AND THE LIMIT OF LUMP-SUM 
REIMB
have assu
future.  Importantly, we also have assumed that a household’s discounting remains constant over 
time.  Constant discounting guarantees that—barring new information—a household’s long-term 
an
su
ex ple intuition and common sense, 
suggests that many people come to regret their impatience or procrastination, so that their ex ante 
preferences are inconsistent with their sentiments after the damage is done.   We show that the 
sh
on
wa
bo
two other important investment decisions: when to purchase more energy-efficient durable 
goods, such as appliances, automobiles, and home insulation; and when to acquire information 
ab
URSEMENT REGIMES 
So far, in establishing that the timing and frequency of the “neutrality payout” matters, we 
med that households are impatient: they discount costs and benefits that are in the 
d short-term preferences will always coincide, a result that rules out self-control problems, 
ch as overconsumption and procrastination.158   
In this Part we relax this time-consistency assumption.  Evidence from numerous 
periments and field studies by economists, not to mention sim
 
 Q.J. ECON. 573, 573--78 (1992) (describing differences between prediction of standard discounting model and 
erved instances of overconsumption and procrastination). 
nfra text accompanying notes 160--176 . 
158 See George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, 
107
obs
159 See i
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even if poor and rich households have identical self-control problems, the poor will fare worse 
on average due to their tighter budget constraints and the diminishing marginal utility of wealth.  
Pa
re
An 
decision are not all incurred or received in the same time period.160  The relative timing of costs 
and rewar
rec
ac
ca
payo 163
Early work in formalizing intertemporal choice used an exponential discount function, which, 
wh
ac
ad
ma
tim
 
rts III.A. and III.B. provide a general overview of the quasi-hyperbolic model applied in the 
mainder of Part III; those familiar with the model can safely proceed to Section C. 
A.  Intertemporal Decisions and the Evidence on Time-Inconsistency 
intertemporal decision is one in which the costs and rewards that flow from the 
ds matters because, as a general matter, people are impatient in that they prefer to 
eive benefits as early as possible and delay incurring costs until future periods.161  A rational 
tor will choose her behavior to maximize the sum of her current and future well-being.162  This 
n be modeled using an intertemporal utility function that sums up the instantaneous utility (the 
ffs) in each relevant time period as discounted to account for an actor’s time preference.   
ile easier to use, has an important (but, in hindsight, undesirable) side effect: it implies that 
tors have a constant level of impatience.164  In short, an exponential discounter will never give 
ded weight to immediate costs and rewards and thus will always act in a time-consistent 
nner.165  But there is a large body of empirical evidence showing that people routinely exhibit 
e-inconsistent preferences, because of a short-term preference for immediate gratification that 
                                                 
George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 181 (1989). 
Id. 
Id. 
HAVIORAL ECONOMICS 162, 166–67 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2007) (stating that the exponential function is 
 only one that ensures that actors will exhibit constant levels of impatience). 
160 
161 Loewenstein & Prelec, supra note 158, at 573  
162 
163 
164 See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in ADVANCES IN 
BE
the
165 Id. at 170 (“Constant discounting implies that a person’s intertemporal preferences are time-consistent, which 
means that later preferences ‘confirm’ earlier preferences.”). 
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leads them to override their long-term preferences.166  It is this asymmetry between long-term 
and short-term impatience that leads people to procrastinate and overconsume.  
originated
the
im
perspective.168  A common type of experiment to test whether people have time-inconsistent 
preferences asks subjects to choose between a smaller, earlier reward and a higher, delayed one, 
wh ta
sm
a l  in the bank 
earning interest.170  He then asked them how much interest they would require to make them 
167
The principal challenge to the time-consistency assumption of neoclassical theory 
 in a series of experiments finding that people value immediate gratification and 
refore exhibit declining, instead of constant, discount rates. In short, people discount 
mediate payoffs more steeply than they discount those same payoffs from a long-term 
ere in some ins nces the smaller reward can be received immediately and in others both the 
aller and larger rewards are delayed until future periods.169 
In an early study, the economist Richard Thaler told subjects to imagine that they had won 
ottery and could choose to either receive the money immediately or leave it
                                                 
r reviews, see Frederick et al., supra note 164, at 172--79; Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 160, at 183--90. 
Importantly, economists embraced exponential discounting because it made their models more tractable 
166 Fo
167 
mathematically, not because they believed that real-world actors use exponential functions.  See BECKER, supra note 
__, at 11 (“The assumption of consistent preferences is clearly not a literal description of much actual 
behavior . . . but it is an extremely useful simplification of behavior.”); Frederick et al., supra note 164, at 167 
(noting that earlier economists adopted the model for its ease of use, not its accuracy).  Unlike the large body of 
evidence supporting the time-inconsistency assumption, there is no systematic evidence finding that people have 
constant discount rates.  See Warren K. Bickel & Matthew W. Johnson, Delay Discounting: A Fundamental 
Be
ON 
dis
als
168 
hy
AD
gen
ke
dis
169
12
170
havioral Process of Drug Dependence, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 419, 422 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003) (stating that “[e]xponential 
counting . . . has not been empirically supported by behavioral research” conducted in humans and animals); see 
o infra Part III.C (describing evidence that real-world actors have declining discount rates). 
See GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS 63–80 (1992) (describing evidence of declining discount rates and using 
perbolas to model them); Christopher Harris & David Laibson, Hyperbolic Discounting & Consumption, in 
VANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 258, 258 (Mathis Dewatripont et al eds., 2003) (stating that 
eralized hyperbolic discount functions decline at a faster rate in the short-run than in the long-run, matching a 
y feature of experimental data); Loewenstein & Prelec, supra note 158,at 579–81 (1992) (setting forth hyperbolic 
count function). 
 See RICHARD H. THALER, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 
7, 128–29 (1991). 
 Id. 
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 the sum of its instantaneous utility in periods 1 through n: δu1 + δ2u2 + δ3u3 +…δnun.  
ousehold will reach the same exact conclusion, since in period 0, it discounts periods 1 
2 3 n
However, in period 1, the TC household will act to maximize: u  + δu  + δ2u  +…δn−1u , 
ile its TI counterpart will maximize u1 +β δu2 + βδ2u3 +…βδn−1un.  Since βδ < δ, in period 1, 
                                                
 
indifferent between receiving $15 immediately or in three, twelve, and thirty-six months.171  The 
required median returns were $30, $60, and $100, respectively, which translates into 
co
th
re
stination   
It is e-inconsistent (“TI”) 
households make intertemporal decisions.  We will assume that a household will choose a 
consumpt
fac
im
appl
incur an immediate cost or grab an immediate reward.   
typ
pe of action that will 
maximize
A TI h
through n by βδu1 +β δ u2 + βδ u3 +…βδ un, which reduces to the standard exponential function.   
1 2 3 n
wh
ntinuously compounded discount rates of 277%, 139%, and 63%, for the three, twelve, and 
irty-six month delays.172  As can be seen, the implicit discount rate declined as the delay in 
ceiving the money increased.173 
B. Overconsumption and Procra
 helpful to compare the way that time-consistent (“TC”) and tim
ion path that takes into account its long-term impatience, as captured by a discount 
tor, δ.  Moreover, the decisions of TI households will also be affected by their preference for 
mediate gratification, as captured by a short-term discount factor, β, set to less than 1, and 
icable only when the household is making a short-term decision: one in which it either has to 
From the long-term perspective of period 0, when all costs and benefits are delayed, both 
es discount future payoffs using a standard exponential function.  That is, from the 
rspective of period 0, a TC household will choose the future course 
 
Id. at 130. 
Id. at 129. 
171 
172 Id. 
173 
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the TI household will give greater weight to the instantaneous utility, u , than its TC counterpart 
and its own previous self.  That is, given its preference for immediate gratification, it will value 
pre
see
ov
pro
ption Scenario: Immediate Benefits and Delayed Costs 
Smoking, eating tasty but unhealthy foods, indulging in one’s youth instead of saving for 
retiremen
will refer
but
over
term decisions to override that preference, solely due to the added weight it gives to immediate 
grat
tri
ho
household
TI 1 2
 
s give no added weight to immediate gratification they will keep to their plan, but their 
counterparts will override their original decision whenever, v  + βδc  ? 0 (assuming that it 
1
sent utility more now than it did from the long-term perspective of period 0.  As we will now 
, if that immediate utility is a benefit, a TI household will have an greater incentive to 
erconsume.  If the immediate utility is a cost, the TI household has a greater incentive to 
crastinate.   
1. Overconsum
t—all require a tradeoff between an immediate benefit and delayed consequences.  We 
 to a consumption scenario as one in which a household can grab an immediate benefit, 
 doing so triggers a cost that it will bear in the future.  We will also say that a household 
consumes whenever it has a long-term preference to abstain, but makes one or more short-
ification.  It follows that TC households will never overconsume in this manner.     
More formally, suppose that consuming in period 1 provides an immediate benefit, v1, but 
ggers a delayed cost in the following period, c2.  From the perspective of period 0, TC and TI 
useholds will both decide not to consume in period 1 whenever v1 + δc2 < 0.  Since TC 
Comment: these greek letters seem to 
te large white spaces in my version of 
document.  Do you have that problem 
ours? 
crea
the 
in y
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consumes if it is indifferent).  Moreover, it follows that all other things being equal a household’s 
incentive to overconsume will increase the higher the immediate benefits and the greater its 
pr
2. Procrastination Scenario: Immediate Costs and Delayed Benefits 
An 
a future benefit: exercising, writing a paper, getting a divorce, entering into a contract, or 
acquiring information to reduce transactional risks.  A household procrastinates when it has a 
lon
de
co
rew .  From the perspective of period 0, TC and TI households will both decide 
to comple 1 2
procrastinate whenever, c1 + βδv2 < 0.  As with overconsumption, households are more likely to 
procrastinate the higher the immediate costs of completing A and the greater their short-term 
impatience. 
 
te A in period 1, whenever, c  + δv  ? 0.  TI Households, however, will choose to 
eference for immediate gratification.  
investment scenario is one in which an actor has to incur a cost in the present to create 
g-term preference to complete A in period t, but makes one or more short-term decisions to 
lay doing so, solely due to the added weight it gives to the immediate costs it must incur to 
mplete A.    
Suppose that completing A in period 1 requires an immediate investment of c1, yielding a 
ard in period 2, v2
3. Repeated Overconsumption and Procrastination 
At any one point, a household will be guided by its overall goal of maximizing the sum of 
its curren
the
the
decis
More formally, at time t, a household will try to predict the β that it will use at t + 1.  If we 
let 
t and future welfare.  In order to do this, it will have to predict how it expects to act in 
 future.  It follows that TI households must try to predict the short-term discount factor that 
y expect to use in future periods, when making short-term consumption and investment 
ions.   
 be its prediction, then a correct prediction is one in which  = β.  Such a sophisticated 
household will make a correct assessment of its future propensity to overconsume and 
pro
pre
beli
time-c sistent manner and thus has a 
cras nate and adopt commitment devices to assure that it keeps to its long- m 
ferences.
ti
on
ter
174  On the other hand a naïve household is one that period after period incorrectly 
eves that in the future it will exhibit perfect self-control; that is it believes that it will act in a 
 = 1, notwithstanding the fact that it h  β < 1.  It 
follo at naïve households will repeatedly overconsume and procrastinat eving each 
time th  they are doing so for the last time.  It is unlikely that actual househo e completely 
na
gra
as a
e, beli
lds ar
ws th
at
ïve or sophisticated.175  More likely, they know hat they have a preference for immediate 
tification—a β <1—but are overly optimistic of their future willpower.
 t
176  A partially naïve 
                                                 
mitment devices are mechanisms that restrict an actor’s ability to yield to the pull of immediate gratification.  
re generally, a commitment device is a type of externally imposed self-regulation mechanism adopted to 
See 
UMEISTER ET AL., LOSING CONTROL: HOW AND WHY PEOPLE FAIL AT SELF-REGULATION 6–7 (1994) (describing 
 ability among human beings “to exert control over one’s own inner states, processes, and responses” and 
 
 
42
174 Com
Mo
overcome self-control problems when relying on internal sources of self-regulation is not sufficient. ROY F. 
BA
the
defining self-regulation as “any effort by a human being to alter its own responses” so as to override the push to act 
in ways that diverge from what they really want). 
175 See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON. 121, 122--160 (2001) 
(developing a model of partially naïve households). 
176 See id. at 149 (suggesting that earlier findings support model of optimism about future willpower). 
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household is one that has β <  < 1.  Importantly, even a relatively small misprediction can lead 
partially naïve households to repe verconsume or procrastinate—i.e., to act in the same as 
if 
 implic ns of these findings for a consumption tax/rebate 
regime.  
ption in Prebate Regime 
On its face, ms like a plausible 
mechanism to achieve tax neutrality. ce the poor household receives the prebate before 
incurring
ord
it w
the prebate faster than TC households and thus faster than they want to from a long-term 
perspective.  It follows that TI hou at are liquidity constrained will overconsume carbon 
pro
pre
co
co
some households to overconsume carbon products, something that goes against the basic goal of 
reducing consumption. 
prebate regime in which households receive the funds on December 31, and make a long-term 
atedly o
atio
 Sin
, 
seholds th
it were fully naïve. 
We will now lay out the
C.  Overconsum
a lump sum payment at the beginning of the year see
 the tax liability, it will not have to borrow, as in the case of a rebate.  Nonetheless, in 
er to smooth consumption—to use the prebate to pay the carbon taxes, as they become due—
ill have to save.  We now show that, all other things being equal, TI households will consume 
ducts at the beginning of the year and be forced to cut back once they have gone through the 
bate funds.  Moreover, under a prebate regime, TI households that are not liquidity 
nstrained will overconsume at the beginning of the year and continue down their long-term 
nsumption path the rest of the year.  In short, a prebate can have the perverse effect of leading 
1.  Smoothing Problem: Liquidity Constrained Households 
In order to focus on the overconsumption problem, it is helpful to limit our attention to a 
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t each month that they spend more than $200 in taxes (the “excess carbon”) they trigger a 
layed cost, borne in the following months, when they are forced to consume less electricity 
an they had wanted.  Let v1 = $500 be the immediate benefits of consuming more electricity 
an the allotted monthly amount, and c1= $900 the delayed cost of exceeding the allotment—
− $900)  < 0.  But while the TC household keeps to its optimal consumption plan, come 
uary, its TI counterpart does not, since it now compares an immediate benefit of $500 with a 
layed, discounted cost of 0.5 × $900 = $450.  While this is a relatively simple example, it does 
plan setting forth how much electricity to consume during the coming year, keeping all other 
liabilities fixed.  We begin with households that are liquidity constrained: if they run out of funds 
be
co
de
lia
utility over the whole year, they need to smooth their electricity consumption in this manner.  
While they anticipate that this consumption plan will require sacrifices—using fans instead of air 
co
m
as t factor, δ = 1 (this does not affect the general 
results in any way), and the TI household has a short-term discount factor, β = 0.5.  Each time 
they use electricity they receive an immediate benefit—using air conditioning instead of a fan—
bu
de
th
th
i.e., due to the electricity shortfall, after it has exhausted the prebate.  From the long-term 
perspective of December 31, both households will plan to keep to the allotment, given that $500 
+ (
Jan
de
fore the year is through, they will have no other choice but to cut back their electric 
nsumption.  To simplify matters we will assume that they receive a prebate of $2,400 and 
cide to consume the same amount of electric power each month, leading to a monthly tax 
bility of $200.  In other words, they conclude that in order to maximize their intertemporal 
nditioning and blankets instead of electric heaters—they believe that it is the one that will 
inimize these shortfalls in utility.   
Consider a TC versus a TI household.  To isolate the effect of short-term discounting, 
sume that they both have a long-term discoun
provide the underlying intuition: all other things being equal, a TI household will go through the 
prebate funds sooner than what it believes is optimal.  Additionally, policymakers who fail to 
tak
re
overconsu 177
since naïve households always conclude that in the future they will act in a time-consistent 
manner, they will overconsume each month, believing that they are doing so for the last time, 
an
a p
e this into account, and instead adopt the standard time-consistency assumption, will fail to 
alize the way that the prebate can distort the consumption decision of real households. 
As we saw above, a fully sophisticated household will anticipate its future propensity to 
me, and adopt commitment devices if available and affordable.   On the other hand, 
d will go without electricity once they have exhausted the prebate funds.  Finally, suppose that 
artially naïve household has a = 0.556, which is a relatively small misprediction, given that 
 true β = 0.5.  That household will nonetheless overconsume each month, since it believes 
orrectly that it will later decide that it wi  keep to its consumption plan—i.e., (0.556 × $900) 
There is evidence that households behave in this manner with respect to other lump-sum 
yments—e.g. food stamps and social security benefits.  For example, Bertrand and Morse find 
t taxpayers whose other be
its
inc
= $500.40 > $500.   
pa
tha havior suggests a susceptibility to “temptation” are most likely to 
spend the
int
various possible explanations opts for one similar to our prebate explanation—sufficiently naïve 
TI households will overconsume earlier in the month and have to curtail their food consumption 
                                                
ll
ir tax rebate on indulgences rather than paying bills.178  Shapiro found that caloric 
ake in households receiving food stamps declines as the month goes on, and after considering 
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177 
178 Bert
See supra text accompanying notes 173--174. 
rand & Morse, supra note 84, at 7--9. 
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as the month progresses.179  There is also evidence that purchases tend to increase on paydays, 
particularly for leisure goods that provide an immediate benefit, including food, alcohol, and 
dru
(af
ex
iquidity Constrained Households 
Sup
have enough cash to consume the monthly allotment of electricity, it can meet that shortfall by 
borrowin
wa
util
fin
will have to borrow funds and incur a delayed finance charge of $2,000, and that the utility of 
consumin
wi
ulti
sta
Non
 
gs.180  And, most on point for us, Ayres et al. find that energy consumption rises on Fridays 
ter controlling for weather and other likely causal factors), 181 which we suggest could be 
plained by a payday effect. 
2.  Overconsumption: Non-L
pose now that the TI household is not liquidity constrained: if in any month it does not 
g.  Borrowing however is expensive; assume that given finance costs a household will 
nt to borrow to meet the allotment shortfall, but no more.  In other words, the immediate 
ity of consuming the whole allotment of electricity is sufficiently high to meet the delayed 
ance costs.  More specifically, assume that to pay for the full monthly allotment a household 
g that full allotment translates to $1,200.  From a long term perspective a TI household 
th a β = 0.5 will want to avoid the finance charges, but given its short-term preferences it will 
mately find it worthwhile to borrow the funds.  Under this scenario, the TI household will 
rt the year with a long-term preference never to exceed the monthly allotment of electricity.  
etheless, if one continues to work with the numbers from the example above, this household 
                                                 
BLIC ECON. 303 (2005).  Also discuss 
See Carlos Dobkin and Steven Puller, The Effect of Government Transfers on Monthly Cycles in Drug Abuse, 
urity Recipients Smooth Consumption between Checks?, 93 AMER. ECON. REV. 406 (2003); David Huffman and 
tias Barenstein, Riches to Rags Every Month? The Fall in Consumption Expenditures Between Paydays 
e-inconsistency, the authors provide a number of possible explanations. 
n Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Comparison Feedback Can Reduce 
179 See Jesse M. Shapiro, Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp Nutrition Cycle, 89 J. 
PU
180 
Hospitalization and Mortality, 91 J. PUBLIC ECON. 2137 (2007); Melvin Stephens Jr., “3rd of the Month”: Do Social 
Sec
Ma
(Working Paper, Dec. 2004).  NOTE: while these all find a pattern that can be explained, at least in part, due to 
tim
181 Ia
Residential Energy Usage 11 & fig.8 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434950.  For 
yet more evidence that impatience impairs savings, see Brown et al., supra note 151, at 199. 
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will overconsume during the early part of the year, and when it has exhausted the prebate will 
borrow to meet the shortfall.  It will do so even though borrowing funds creates a welfare loss 
th
olds not only lose their own welfare, but may also 
frustrate t
co
acts as a powerful commitment device, albeit one that comes into play too late to help the 
household: poverty assures that regardless of how the household allocates its electricity 
co
On
nu
ele
form of finance charges, that need to be accounted in the social welfare function, but since it 
continues to consume electricity for the rest of the year, will end up consuming more than the 
we
dis
co
that it will want to consume in each month.  In reality, the household will face unforeseen 
shocks—a summer far warmer, or winter far colder than usual—and will have to adjust their 
co liquidity constraints, they will want to guard 
      
at it had wanted to avoid.182     
Unconstrained and impatient househ
he goals of the carbon tax.  A prebate regime will create a welfare loss for the liquidity 
nstrained household, and thus will reduce aggregate social welfare.  Nonetheless, poverty here 
nsumption it will never consume more than the total amount that it had committed to consume.  
 the other hand, the household that is not liquidity constrained will overconsume for the same 
mber of months as its liquidity constrained counterpart, but will continue to consume 
ctricity after it has exhausted the prebate.  This household also faces a welfare loss, in the 
alth constrained household.  It follows that if two households have the same short-term 
count factor, the richer household will consume more since it is in a better position to bear the 
sts from its overconsumption.   
So far we have assumed that the household can accurately predict the amount of electricity 
nsumption plan accordingly.183  Given their 
 
M  
ON. REV. 412, 415 (2009) (offering evidence that credit cards may lead to overconsumption out of impatience). 
We will suppose that it makes it long-term cost benefit analysis on a day in which the weather is perfect, and 
s for no artificial re-conditioning.  The reason for this assumption is that a number of studies have found that 
182 See Sumit Agarwal et al., Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit Scoring Puzzles?, 99 A .
EC
183 
call
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me and effort, along with myriad other transaction costs—comparing intermediaries, 
ntifying transactional hazards, and disclosing information that they prefer keep quiet, such as 
ir immigration status.  While all of these costs are incurred immediately, the benefits from 
ing are not all received immediately.   As we have seen it is this combination of 
ce it may appear that a household that borrows funds gets an immediate benefit, this is the 
                                                                                                                                                            
against unexpected contingencies by saving during months with unforeseen lower consumption 
needs.  However, TI households that give into temptation and overconsume will save less than 
op
sh
Wh s for a 
prebate, procrastination behaviors interact with a tax/rebate regime in several complex ways.  
First, as w
sm
pro
lea
Part II.  TI households may fail to smooth consumption because they repeatedly procrastinate 
bo lds to 
expend ti
ide
the
smooth 184
immediate costs and delayed rewards that creates the specter of procrastination.  Although at first 
glan
timal during those months, which will put them in a more precarious position when outside 
ocks lead them to prefer using a greater amount of energy than they had anticipated.   
D.  Procrastination and Consumption Smoothing 
ile the impulse to overconsume has relatively straightforward implication
e explain in this section, procrastination may impact the extent to which households 
ooth their consumption over time.  In Parts III.E. and III.F., we note two other effects of 
crastination: lower investments in carbon-reducing technologies, and lower investments in 
rning about the tax’s incentives to reduce carbon consumption. 
Time-inconsistency compounds the obstacles to consumption smoothing we surveyed in 
rrowing or saving funds.  These two types of financial transactions require househo
 
ple tend to mispredict their future preference because they project they give undue weight to their current state 
ause it projects its current sated state in trying to ascertain how hungry she will feel by lunch.  See ….(discussing 
jection bias).  
seholds might not invest optimally for their future). 
peo
when making such predictions.  For example, someone who has just had a large breakfast may order a light lunch 
bec
pro
184 See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 175,at 148--49 (explaining why partially naïve time-inconsistent 
hou
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case only when it leads to immediate consumption.  A payday loan used to acquire groceries or 
some leisure activity is different than one used to pay bills—the benefit from paying them is to 
av
poor hous
sa 185
have generally acknowledged that such a state of affairs will make it more difficult for poor 
households to get out of the poverty trap,  once one allows for TI households, it is easy to see 
tha
If a
fac
gre
higher immediate costs faced by the poor household will lead it to procrastinate longer and in a 
greater number of transactions.   These higher transaction costs will lead poor households to 
sm
eq
me
prevent them from doing so.   
Present-bias also can raise the cost of income smoothing.  When choosing between 
financial 
oid the future disutility associated with collection agencies or having one’s utilities shut off.  
Procrastination is particularly damaging for low-income families.  There is evidence that 
eholds have less access to financial institutions and the full panoply of credit and 
vings products that are readily available to higher income households.   While commentators 
186
t the problem goes deeper: even relatively small hurdles can lead to repeated procrastination.  
 poor household and a rich one have identical short-term discount factors, but the poor one 
es higher transaction costs when entering financial transaction, it follows that it will have a 
ater incentive to procrastinate.  In other words, both households may procrastinate, but the 
187
ooth less than they believed optimal, from a long-term perspective, and less than otherwise 
uivalent households who face lower transaction costs. 
Thus, TI households may have lower welfare under either a rebate or a prebate.  Both 
chanisms assume families will smooth consumption, but the impulse to procrastinate may 
institutions, TI households are more likely to enter into transactions offering lower up-
                                                 
Campbell, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1563--64; Littwin, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
E.g., Barr, supra note 94, at 123. 
Cf. Campbell. supra note Error! Bookmark
185 
defined., at 463. 
186 
187  not defined., at 1563, 1568--69 (noting that fixed costs of learning 
about financial markets tends to reduce participation by less-wealthy households). 
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front costs, even if they have higher long-run costs.188  There is evidence that consumers react to 
teaser rates from credit card companies in just this manner, choosing cards which provide greater 
be
rat
len
pro
costs associated with getting a loan are very low compared to other sources of funds.190  This 
may explain why poor households may rely on them instead of credit cards: applying for and 
rec
in 
ansition 
away from
incentive to procrastinate investing in carbon abatement technology—energy efficient 
appliance
wil
ho
hav
 
nefits up front, even though once the introductory period is over the cards have higher interest 
es.189  One can extend the general intuition to explain why poor households resort to payday 
ders who charge exorbitant rates.  There are two important characteristic of payday loan 
viders: their location and advertisement makes them very convenient; and the transaction 
eiving a credit card takes time and effort and must be timed so that it occurs at a point in time 
which the household has sufficient income security to be approved.  
E. Procrastination in Making Transition Away from Carbon Dependence  
One of the goals of the carbon tax is to cause households to invest in making the tr
 carbon dependency.191  We now argue that time-inconsistent households will face an 
s, hybrid automobiles, better home insulation.192  As with any other investment, this 
l require an immediate expense in order to create a valuable future income stream.  Again, TI 
useholds are likely to procrastinate in the face of even small present costs.  This delay will 
e important implications for both the efficacy and incidence of carbon taxes.   
                                                 
Bar-Gill, supra note 105, at 1119. 
Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? 10 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. 
search, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), available at 
See Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 515--17 (arguing for dedicating some of the revenue from a carbon tax 
 this purpose). 
188 
189 See [Haiyan Shui & Lawrence Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in Credit Card Markets…..] 
190 
Re
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_ 2005-09_Flannery_Samolyk.pdf. 
191 
for
192 Since businesses will need to make the same type of transition investments, they too will have an incentive to 
procrastinate, but this more general problem is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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Indeed, a number of recent studies have found that time-inconsistent preferences can lead 
individuals to procrastinate making analogous exit decisions even when the immediate costs are 
m
sa
red
tim
invest in carbon reduction, since the benefit of avoiding taxes is always largely in the future.  
And as other households respond more rationally to the tax, the relative amount of carbon 
pro
pro
the same l
Nonetheless, carbon tax will leave a poor household worse off because the household faces 
higher immediate costs of making the transition to a lower-carbon-consumption lifestyle.  
Ho
eff
pro
                                                
uch lower than those require to make the transition out of a high-carbon lifelstyle.193  If these 
me dynamics are at play in a carbon tax, procrastination will both reduce the amount of carbon 
uction from the tax and also shift the incidence of carbon taxes towards TI households over 
e.  Carbon emissions remain higher with procrastination because families repeatedly fail to 
duced by TI households --- and the concomitant share of tax they pay --- will increase.   
Although these two effects are true at all income levels, they once more are especially 
nounced at the lowest incomes.  Assume, as we have throughout, that the poor and rich have 
evel of short-term impatience and level of awareness about their self-control problems.  
194
useholds that are liquidity constrained will need to save before they can invest in these more 
icient durable goods, but this will require them to divert funds away from higher utility 
ducts such as food or shelter or those that provide an sufficiently high immediate utility—
 
193
(20
an Ex-Sex Worker: Making Transitions Out of a Deviant Career, 2 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 74, 75–76 (2007) 
(de
ex
Hyperbolic Time Preferences 1–3 (IZA Discussion Paper No. 2113, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=706281
 See Stefano DellaVigna & M. Daniele Paserman, Job Search and Impatience, 23 J. LABOR ECON. 527, 565, 569 
05) (finding that impatient unemployed workers expended less effort to find new job); Teela Sanders, Becoming 
scribing studies finding that women delay leaving the sex trade because of the immediate economic costs of 
iting, such as drug use and lack of an available alternative work); Francesco Drago, Career Consequences of 
 (finding that impatient employees expended less effort to get promoted); Hanming 
Fang & Dan Silverman, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare Program Participation: Evidence from the NLSY 1, Feb. 
2006 (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Houston Law Review) (finding impatient women exerted less effort 
to t
194 
wit
ransition from welfare to work).  
Cf. Super, supra note 5, at 39 (noting that costs of energy efficiency may be a bar for low-income families even 
h some government assistance). 
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leisure goods.  Because of this, poor households are more likely to procrastinate making the 
transition away from carbon consumption than wealthier households.   
 
efficient d
re
ha 196
renters are responsible for paying utilities, they are unlikely to replace existing appliances with 
energy efficient ones.   Even if one were to adopt the strong assumption that the market for 
ren
un
rel
a r
an apartment.  In conclusion, one would expect that at the very start of a carbon tax regime, poor 
household will already be at a relative disadvantage—they are more likely to own “clunker” 
ap
F.  Procrastination Acquiring Information 
To make a decision to smooth consumption, a household will need more than a tacit 
awareness that a carbon tax is in place and a rebate forthcoming: it needs the right type of 
informati olds will have an 
      
This general inequality is exacerbated by the fact that the transition to more energy
urable goods has been going on for a while and rich households are more likely to 
place appliances and automobiles.195  In fact, many poor households live in rental units and 
ve to make do with the appliances provided by the landlord.   Given that as a general rule 
197
tal property in poor neighborhoods is very competitive (an unlikely fact), the same arguments 
derwriting the hidden taxes discussion in Part II would apply here.  In order to discern the 
ative efficiency of appliances, insulation, and windows, renters will have to first move in.  As 
esult they are unlikely to incorporate their carbon tax implication at the time that they settle on 
pliances and automobiles.  
on, at the right time. We now show that time-inconsistent househ
 
nsive products). 
Richard Counihan and David Nemtzow, Energy Conservation and the Rental Housing Market, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 
Id. 
195 Cf. Shammin & Bullard, supra note 2, at 2436 (finding that poorer households make use of more carbon-
inte
196 
1103, 1104--05 (1981).  
197 
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incentive to procrastinate acquiring information that could reduce the hidden taxes problem or 
put them in a better position to make long-term financial decisions.   
ith the 
taxing auth
tak
th 198
and benefits of investing in carbon abatement, about future shocks that may make it sensible to 
save some of the prebate, about providers of credit who will help it smooth consumption, and 
ab
tha
fol
pro
(discounted) lost bene s from that one-period delay (in the form, for example, of a decline in 
the value of that information).  Procrastination in acquiring information can lead households to 
un
an
                                                
Transacting parties—including taxpayers who are in a long-term transaction w
ority—acquire information in order to become aware of transactional hazards and to 
e actions to reduce those hazards, such as through entering into contracts or discounting for 
e risk.   A household will need to determine how much information to acquire about the costs 
out more general information regarding the carbon tax itself.199  Once a household determines 
t the benefits of acquiring a piece of information exceed the costs, it must still decide when to 
low through.200  As in any procrastinating context, a household will have an incentive to 
crastinate acquiring information whenever the gains from delaying for one period exceed the 
fit
der-appreciate the need to react to the carbon tax, to fail to seek out alternate sources of funds, 
d to neglect the value of investing in carbon abatement.201 
 
198 
268
199 See Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Discounting Financial Literacy: Time Preferences and Participation in 
Fin ining that households 
mu ). 
200 While sometimes it is beneficial to acquire information immediately, at other times it is valuable to wait, given 
that uncertainty regarding the value of that information may be reduced over time.  As Kenneth Arrow argues, 
investments in information often represent irreversible investments that depreciate over time in the same fashion as 
capital investments in tangible assets. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATIONS 39–41 (1974).  An 
im
the
ma
of o
201 
inf
See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation By Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 
--71 (1984) (analyzing incentives of transaction parties to acquire and reveal information). 
ancial Education Programs, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3507, at 2--3 (May 2008) (expla
st decide how much effort to invest in acquiring information about financial matters
plication of the irreversibility of investments in information is that waiting to acquire information, until some of 
 uncertainty regarding the information has been resolved, may be valuable in the same fashion that waiting to 
ke irreversible investments in hard assets may provide the decision-maker with an option value.  On the creation 
ption values in waiting to make irreversible investments, see DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note __, at 6–9.   
See Meier & Sprenger, supra note 199, at 3--4 (reporting evidence that households procrastinate acquiring costly 
ormation). 
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Importantly, households may procrastinate not only in acquiring information about the 
external world, but also about themselves, such as information about their own skill and talents 
or 
in
ac
ind 203
procrastinate receiving free information about themselves, if possessing that information creates 
immediate collateral disutility.    
“m mmentators have implicitly assumed that actors 
will underta
pro 205
the fact that they are procrastinating—whenever the thought appears in their minds, they quickly 
even their propensity to procrastinate.202 In addition to the actual costs of acquiring this 
formation, one must account for various collateral, often immediate, costs associated with 
quiring negative self-evaluative information—for example, the information may challenge an 
ividual’s positive self-image or undermine her self-confidence.  Households may thus 
204
It follows therefore that one important type of procrastination is what could be called 
eta-procrastination.”  For the large part, co
ke repeated cost-benefit analyses to ascertain whether it is sensible to 
crastinate.   However, people often experience an immediate disutility from thinking about 
                                                 
n addition to the exter al informational asymmetries discussed in the law-and-economics literature on 
racting (for example, asymmetrical knowledge about the other party’s characteristics), transacting parties also 
e what one can call “internal informational asymmetries”: an individual’s informational deficits about herself.  
202 I n
cont
fac
These can include imperfect information about her talents, her past actions and their motivations, and her propensity 
to succumb to self-control problems. The economists Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole argue that the actors “who 
usually populate economic models have little doubt about ‘who they are’: they know their own abilities and basic 
preferences.”  See Ronald Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An Economic Approach, in 
THE
wit
(or
203 
rol
PSY
lite
inf
an 
204 
con
to 
Ba
205 
fut
 PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 137, 138 (2003).  In a series of papers, they focus on economic actors 
h imperfect self-knowledge, imperfect willpower and imperfect recall, what they call the “three ‘grains of sand’ 
 humanity) in the well oiled mechanics of the ultra-rational economic agent.” Id. at 137. 
A positive self-image is something that individuals value, and self-confidence and optimism play an important 
e in preserving and bolstering that self-image.  See Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
CHOLOGY 680, 688–92 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (providing overview regarding body of 
rature on how individuals construct and maintain their sense of self, and how they protect it against negative 
ormation that may challenge their self-esteem).  In fact, one way of understanding an individual’s self-image is as 
additional argument to that individual’s utility function.  See Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 142, at 142.    
Economic actors may engage in such “strategic ignorance” aimed at preserving their current levels of self-
fidence. Id. at 144.  As Baumeister states: “Given the powerful motivation to think well of oneself, it is necessary 
ask how people manage to maintain such self-flattering views in the face of mixed and even contrary evidence.”  
umeister, supra note 143, at 690. 
E.g., O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 175,at 122--24 (modeling individuals who periodically calculate expected 
ure costs of procrastination in each successive period). 
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dispose of it without incorporating it into their general deliberation.206  Meta-procrastination can 
thus increase the propensity of people to procrastinate, given that it reduces the salience of the 
de
G. Relative Access to Commitment Devices 
We e same level of short-
term impatience, poor households will face greater welfare losses from their time-inconsistency 
whenever they face higher transaction costs to enter into valuable transactions.  The same 
arg
tha
to 
ha
hou
commitment devices, which are mechanisms for overcoming time-inconsistent behavior.   
re
it, 
are
restrict th
 
layed costs associated with yielding to immediate gratification.  
have just seen that even if poor and wealthy households have th
ument applies to overconsumption: households with greater opportunities to consume goods 
t provide an immediate reward are more likely to overindulge.  Individuals with easier access 
addictive products, for instance, are more likely to become and remain addicted, even if they 
ve a long-term preference to break the addiction.207  But there is an additional reason why poor 
seholds may suffer greater welfare losses: they are less likely to have easy access to low-cost 
Some of the strongest evidence of time-inconsistency, and al world actors’ awareness of 
comes from the fact that people routinely resort to using commitment devices.208 Such devices 
 costly to implement, and even if they were available at zero cost, people are reluctant to 
eir future ability to act freely209 unless they believe that pre-commitment is otherwise 
                                                 
er No. W11867, 2005) (claiming that deciding how to act in the future is experienced as a present cost). 
George Ainslie, A Research-Based Theory of Addictive M tivation, 19 L. & PHIL. 77, 79--91 (2000). 
206 Cf. Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Thinking Ahead: The Decision Problem 1--3 (NBER Working 
Pap
207 o
208 See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 138, at 105 (noting that economists use commitment devices as 
evidence—“smoking guns”—of time-inconsistent preferences). 
209 One cost of commitment is that people generally value their autonomy and find disutility in having their wills 
constrained unnecessarily. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
13–14 (1981) (discussing the cost of commitment and autonomy in the realm of interpersonal contracts). 
  
56
worthwhile.210  As a result, in a world of time-consistent actors, commitment devices would not 
exist.   Nonetheless, people with long-term preferences to eat healthily, exercise, and lose 
we n 
co
co
rgely unavailable to 
poor households.213  For example, retirement accounts and certificates of deposit come with 
built-in penalties for early withdrawal.   TI customers appear to appreciate this feature.   
Ag i
an
ac
211
ight joi health clubs and go to special weight-loss spas, both of which require costly up-front 
mmitments.  Students and professors use deadlines (preferably externally imposed)212 to 
mbat the temptation to procrastinate completing papers. 
Many of the most effective devices for committing to savings are la
214 215
ain, because poor fam lies have only limited access to modern banking and finance, IRA’s 
d CD’s are often out of their reach.216  To the extent that wealthy households have easier 
cess to a greater number of lower cost financial products that have commitment qualities, they 
                                                 
Once we introduce the potential of uncertainty regardin  future payoffs, an intertemporal decisionmaker may find 
versible investments until a decisionmaker has acquired greater information, see AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. 
DYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER CERTAINTY 6–9 (1994).  See also Daniel T. Gilbert & Jane E.J. Ebert, Decisions and 
210 g
it valuable to have an option to reverse her original decision. On the creation of option values by waiting to make 
irre
PIN
Revisions: The Affective Forecasting of Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503, 510–11 
(2002) (finding that, although the individuals who were given the choice to change their minds about which 
pho
still
211
Pr
im
212 
(di
dep
211
We elf-imposition of constraints in the context of purchasing 
cig
req
we
at .com  
Adm
adm
213 
214 
Acc
215 
Ph
216 
tography prints to keep liked their choices less than those individuals who had no ability to change, individuals 
 preferred having the option to change). 
 See Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by 
ecommitment, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 219, 223 (“A rational decision maker with time-consistent preferences would not 
pose constraints on his or her choices.”). 
See, e.g., T.C. Schelling, Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 290, 290 (1978) 
scussing externally imposed self-control devices such as creating an inaccessible savings account and overstating 
endents for tax purposes in order to reduce tax liability in April); see also Ariely & Wertenbroch, supra note 
, at 220–23 (analyzing the role of self-imposed deadlines in addressing temptation to procrastinate); 
rtenbroch, supra note, at 318 (describing the strategic s
arettes). Drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs require minimum stays and full payment (up-front) for the 
uired treatment period, a part of which is kept if the patient checks out early. For example, the Cirque Lodge, a 
ll-known facility of this type, has a thirty-day minimum stay and requires patients to pay for that thirty-day period 
the time that they check in. See The Cirque Lodge, Admission Guidelines, http://www.cirquelodge /
ission/AdmissionGuidelines.php (last visited Aug. 7, 2007) (requiring that “[a] deposit for 30 days is due upon 
ission”). 
Littwin, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 470--71. 
For an overview, see Richard A. Kaplan, Retirement Funding and the Curious Evolution of Individual Retirement 
ounts, 7 ELDER L.J. 283, 292--302 (1999). 
See Nava Ashraf et al., Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the 
ilippines 2 (Apr. 11, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Houston Law Review). 
See sources cited supra note 155. 
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will again have a competitive advantage over poorer households, even though they both have the 
same level of short-term impatience. 
mitment.  The economist David Laibson has 
argued th
hi
ov 217
payments to acquire the illiquid durable good.218  As we have noted, evidence suggests that 
down payment requirements are significant obstacles for poor households.   So again there are 
dis o
rec ouseholds.  
The famil 221
year’s end wou  this assumption, be a soft-paternalist intervention leading to higher social 
welfare.   
so
los yed payment.  The policy challenge then becomes either balancing the gains of 
delay aga
of households, and offer delayed payments only to those for whom delay would increase welfare.  
                                                
 
Illiquid investments can also provide com
at people with long-term preferences to set enough money aside for retirement make 
ghly illiquid investments in their youth—purchasing homes—to prevent themselves from 
erconsuming early in life, much like an IRA.   But this strategy often requires down-
219
parities across income levels in families’ ability to self-c mmit.  
It might be argued that a carbon tax rebate is itself a useful commitment device for 
ipients.220  In this view, the year-end rebate increases welfare for some impatient h
y would prefer to save, but lacks the willpower to do so.   Delaying payment until 
ld, on
There are several flaws with this welfare-increasing logic.  First, it likely describes only 
me households.  Others may be genuinely liquidity constrained, and would suffer large welfare 
ses from dela
inst the losses, or designing a regime that allows the government to sort the two kinds 
 
217 
(19
funds to illiquid assets such as defined benefit pensions, 401(k)’s, social security contributions, and home equity). 
218 
219 
220 See Barr & Dokko, supra note 120, at 2--3 (considering this argument, and reporting that many taxpayers claim 
tha
Me
221 Barr & Dokko, supra note 120, at 5, 14. 
See David Laibson, Life-Cycle Consumption and Hyperbolic Discount Functions, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 861, 868 
98) (discussing commitment devices to deal with procrastination in saving for retirement, including channeling 
Adams et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 57. 
See supra text accompanying notes 74--76. 
t they intentionally over-withhold for this reason); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and 
ntal Accounts, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1990) (suggesting this behavior as an aspect of mental accounting). 
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t, households that are sufficiently sophisticated may have a long-term preference to 
opt commitment devices, but if they require a sufficiently large up-front investment, they will 
ve an incentive to procrastinate.  Of course, they may adopt commitment devices to assure that 
                                                
 
We take up this challenge in Part IV.  The second flaw is that postponing rebates to year’s end 
may actually not be a long enough delay for many households: their need is to save for the much 
lo
th
uti
an
A final flaw is that self-imposed illiquidity is a highly inefficient response to impatience.  
Impatient households can prevent over-consumption by denying themselves access to funds.223  
But they 
wo
tem
ap
Lastly, one important characteristic of commitment devices that has been largely 
overlooked by the literature is that they require an immediate expenditure at the time of adopting 
the enefit in the future, when the actor keeps to its long-term preferences.  
As a resul
ad
ha
they adopt commitment devices, but the same problem arises.  As we will see in Part IV, this 
“meta-procrastination” problem is one reason why governments can increase social welfare by 
nger term, such as retirement needs.222  We are thinking here of the families that quickly spend 
eir rebates on luxuries.  In these households, delay has simply moved spending from one low-
lity usage to another.  Here, too, we think there are possibilities for government intervention, 
d those, too, we set out in Part IV. 
also thereby deny themselves benefits of income smoothing.224  The better mechanism 
uld be one that gave the family access to just enough money to smooth their income without 
pting them to spend too much.  This is a tall order, but government policies can perhaps 
proximate it.       
m, and will produce a b
 
Angeletos et al., supra note 84, at 48. 
See Angeletos et al., supra note 84, at 59 (finding that hyperbolic households hold less liquid wealth, and 
ding that intentional over-withholding is inefficient unless household places extremely high value on present 
sumption over deferred consumption); id. at 22 (noting that commitment to defer refund can cause household to 
ost debt for unexpected short-term needs). 
222 See Barr, supra note 94, at 123 (describing failure of low-income families to save for long-term goals). 
223 
224 
accordingly “smooth consumption less successfully over the life cycle”); cf. Barr & Dokko, supra note 120, at 20 
(fin
con
use high-c
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can leave households with little money for end of the year necessities, and increase 
rbon usage overall.  Commitment devices for overcoming this problem are expensive, and 
se afflicted by present bias may procrastinate investing in the, or even learning about their 
providing off-the-rack commitment devices that parties can opt-into at a lower cost than if they 
had to create them from scratch.   
H.  Immediate vs. Delayed Taxes 
It is ming of the tax itself can also affect 
its level o
experience the tax immediately—e.g., a gasoline tax.  In the second scenario, the consumer gets 
the benefit of consumption before it incurs the disutility of the tax, as with electricity which is 
bil
we
of 
wil
mod
delayed tax that is otherwise equivalent.  In fact, assuming a short-term discount factor of 0.5, a 
TI
I. Summary 
Short-sighted households will respond far differently to a combination of taxes and rebates 
than standard economic theory predicts.  As we have shown here, even if short-sightedness is 
evenly di omes, the consequences of present bias will be especially 
disadvantageous to poor households facing a tax/rebate or tax/prebate system.  Impatient 
spending 
ca
tho
 not just the timing of a rebate that matters; the ti
f effectiveness.  Compare two types of tax schemes.  In the first, the consumer will 
led at the end of the month.  Assuming normal long-term discounting, a delay of one day, a 
ek, or even a month between getting the benefit of consumption and incurring the added cost 
the tax should not matter much.  As a result, models that assume time-consistent households 
l predict that the tax will in essence work the same in both instances.  On the other hand, our 
el predicts that the immediate tax will lead to a greater reduction in consumption than a 
 household will perceive a immediate tax of $1 as providing a disutility of $2.   
stributed across inc
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need for them.  And procrastination will likely slow poor households’ investment in reducing 
their carbon usage, leading to a vicious cycle in which the burden of a carbon tax shifts more and 
m
po
th
BON TAX SYSTEMS 
Thus far, we have shown that annual repayments to poor households do not achieve 
distributio n if it 
means the
we
ex
wo
covered.   
 
an s well as by some defenders of the so-called “Fair Tax.”  As we noted earlier, 
other transactional consumption taxes use different methods to deal with the regressivity 
problem.  
 First, the standard approach, common to both U.S. sales taxes and other nations’ VAT, of 
exempting certain categories of expenditures is inefficient, and particularly unsuited to a carbon 
tax
sw generating any tax revenue for the 
 
ore towards those families.  Taken together, all these features point to an urgent need for 
licymakers to take cognitive factors into account in designing a rebate scheme.  We take up 
at challenge in the next Part. 
IV. DESIGN OF FAIRER CAR
nal neutrality of welfare.  We do not propose, though, to maintain fairness eve
 polar icecaps melt.  Instead, drawing on existing research into behavioral economics, 
 suggest in this Part alternative formulations of transactional consumption taxes that we 
pect to perform better at recompensing poor households.  First, though, we must say a few 
rds about the inadequacy of some other versions of the consumption-tax offset we haven’t yet 
 A.  Problems with Other Consumption Tax Offsets 
To this point we have mainly critiqued the annual-rebate approach suggested by Metcalf 
d Weisbach, a
These solutions, too, are unsatisfying. 
.  As is well known, taxing some forms of consumption but not others encourages shoppers to 
itch to the untaxed options, reducing their welfare without 
 government.225  In addition, taxing some products more than others leads to difficult line-
drawing problems, resulting in needless uncertainty and transaction costs.   For instance, there 
is er
als
“a
co
the item that policy makers wish to discourage use of would be counter-productive.229     
 Some jurisdictions have also tried to simply exempt persons below a certain income 
thr
tax.  For co
dis
eit 230
problem: the use of straw purchasers to buy goods tax-free for those who ought to pay the 
consumption tax.   
 b
mi
red ach paycheck; some versions of the “Fair Tax” would grant monthly 
prebates.231
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case-law on whether ice cream pops are “food” (exempt) or “candy” (not exempt).227  Th e is 
o a current EU dispute over whether arcade-type machines that show pornographic films are 
utomated recreation devices” (heavily taxed) or “cubical cinemas” (lightly taxed).228  And of 
urse in the special case of a pigouvian tax such as the carbon tax exempting consumption of 
eshold from having to pay consumption taxes.  This is, again, not a viable option for a carbon 
nsumption taxes more generally, the problem is that the scheme creates “cliffs”: sharp 
continuities in tax treatment at certain income levels.  That creates significant distortions in 
her actual or reported labor effort near the threshold.   Another kind of fraud is also a 
Lastly, other authors, evidently somewhat cognizant of the pro lem of some timing 
smatches, have proposed rebates more frequently than once per year.  Graetz suggests 
ucing payroll taxes in e
  As we have shown, the problem of income smoothing does not arise solely across 
                                                 
See Kirk Stark, The Uneasy Case for Extending the Sales Tax to Services, 30 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 435, 446--
(2003) (explaining distortive effect of sales taxes on some goods but not others). 
4--35 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1989) (Answer: candy). 
Charles Forell  A Peep at EU Tax Law.  Read On.  Really., posted to WSJ Blogs, Real Time Brussels, March 12, 
225 Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 513--14. 
226 
48 
227 To choose but one of many such cases, see O’Boyle’s Ice Cream Island, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 553 A.2d 1033, 
103
228 e,
2010. 
229 Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 514. 
230 See Fennell, supra note 30, at 56 (noting this problem arises for any sharp income threshold). 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 47--50. 
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co t requires advance notification for withdrawals” as a way to limit impulsive 
                                                
 
gaps of eleven months, but also from paycheck to paycheck.232  In addition, these kinds of up-
front payments continue raise similar dangers to those that we identified for prebates more 
ge
Gr
wo
 
 B.  
 In the absence of effective other solutions, consumption tax designers must walk a 
narrow pa n the one hand, making rebate funds 
av  to
wi
em
households who would prefer not to have saved worse off, and will make all of them more 
vulnerable to short-term fiscal crises.  What is needed, then, is an instrument that will make the 
reb
tem
 
ha
would the enable to choose in advance to limit the amount of credit that would be available to 
them.   Littwin’s solution is similar to a proposal by David Laibson, who suggested “a bank 
ac unt tha
nerally: impulsive spending and other difficulties in saving for anticipated future costs.  In 
aetz’s case, there is the further problem that he offers no obvious solution for those who do not 
rk or work in the “informal economy” and so already pay no payroll taxes.  
In short, other solutions are still needed. 
Self-Directed Debit Cards 
th between two opposing sets of problems.  O
ailable o early can tempt time-inconsistent households into spending too soon, leaving them 
th insufficient funds to cover their later tax and essentials, and potentially raising carbon 
issions overall.  On the other, locking funds away until the end of the year may leave those 
ate available throughout the year, but not too available, and especially not so available as to 
pt the impatient. 
We suggest that self-directed debit cards, or “SDD’s,” can fill this need.  Angela Littwin 
s previously suggested the creation of what she calls “self-directed credit cards”: cards that 
233
 
See supra text accompanying notes 92--115. 232 
233 Littwin, supra note 66, at 485--88. 
  
spending.234  The SDD fits squarely in between these two ideas.  The card would grant the holder 
access to any account into which the government would deposit the holder’s tax rebate.  
Ho
ea
am
ma
would grant access to additional funds a short time later, such as 24 hours. 
 This combination of defaults offers the benefits of income smoothing to all taxpayers, 
wh yers 
wh  place o
im
ov
immediate costs and gains considerably more than equivalent gains and losses in the future.  That 
is the psychological dynamic that causes them to spend their rebate, even though they may know 
the
ca
ga
mu
gratification also will limit tendencies towards impulsive spending.  But, in cases of genuine 
need, the money is still there for the household to use.   
 
am  
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o nly a small discount on future costs and benefits will easily bypass the minor 
pediments to obtaining extra credit.  But these taxpayers are not those who are likely to 
erspend.  Over-spenders, as we have modeled, are those with a β < 1; that is, they value 
y will need the money later to pay their tax or other important bills.  This same dynamic also 
uses procrastination: even a small, immediate cost looms much larger than substantial future 
ins.  As Laibson explains, the annoyance of having to opt out of the credit limit now appears 
ch more significant than the benefit of getting extra money tomorrow.
wever, the card would by default permit only a limited amount of money to be withdrawn 
ch week --- 1/52 of the total, say.  Holders could change this default to increase or decrease the 
ount of money available, but only with some minor but cumbersome effort---filling out and 
iling in a form, or making a phone call to a slightly understaffed calling center.  This opt-out 
ile reducing the likelihood of impulsive spending by those who are present-biased.  Taxpa
235  The delay in any 
We also want to emphasize the usefulness of allowing card-holders to decrease the 
ount of money available on the card for any given period.  This has several advantages. 
 
234 
563
235 Id
David J. Laibson, Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy, NBER Working Paper No. 
5 (June 1996), at 21--22. 
. 
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Sophisticates, those who know that they have a β < 1, may wish to set their limit even lower than 
the default to prevent any impulsive purchases.  As we noted, many taxpayers attempt to use tax 
re
ev
av
ps
to commit in advance (albeit with a cumbersome opt-out)  to transfer any year-end balance to a 
linked savings account, as in Thaler and Sunstein’s “save more tomorrow” plan,  so that they 
wi
 
int e loan program could include many soft 
limits simil
some effort by the recipient, on the amount of loan funds available in any one week or month.  
We prefer the debit card, however, because it would also have the significant advantage of 
giv
it.2
 
aff
usually ot easily pay for either, increasing welfare with little government expenditure.239  
Expanding access to credit could save government dollars in other programs, such as food 
bates as a form of forced savings, but that technique sacrifices liquidity that may be vital in the 
ent of emergencies.  Many such families also immediately spend the rebate when it becomes 
ailable.236  The SDD can overcome both these problems: money is available when needed, but 
ychologically difficult to access.  And we would also suggest a feature allowing card-holders 
237
ll not be as tempted to spend the funds.   
An alternative version of this plan would simply allow the government itself, or qualified 
ermediaries, to loan rebate proceeds to recipients.  Th
ar to those that would exist with the debit-card, such as a default cap, waivable with 
ing access to modern banking to the large segment of poor households who currently lack 
38       
Each of these alternatives offers a number of significant benefits.  For one, they provide 
ordable income smoothing together with accessible commitment devices for households that 
cann
 
See sources cited supra note 70. 
On the advantages of expanding banking access, see Barr, supra note 94, at 176. 
Cf. Fennell & Stark, supra note 12, at 47 (noting that a tax system that facilitated income smoothing could 
rease welfare cost-effectively). 
236 
237 Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 105--119. 
238 
239 
inc
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stamps and free health care, as families will be more able to pay their own way.240  Though a 
debit card program might carry some administrative costs, it could also be piggy-backed on 
ex
 
consumptio
sel
form of social insurance designed for poor working families and administered through the 
federal income tax.   Currently, many households use refund anticipation loans to get early 
ac
by
pro
ho
rebate recipients, that transfer should increase substantially overall social welfare.244    
 
an
if given a rebate in addition to their existing funds.  Here, again, it is possible to nudge 
consumers 
 
isting government e-payments, such as the “EBT” program used to deliver food stamps.241     
Indeed, these plans seem so sensible to us that we see no reason to limit them to 
n tax rebates.  In particular, offering income smoothing through a government-issued 
f-limited debit seems an excellent vehicle for delivering the Earned-Income Tax Credit, a 
242
cess to their EITC payment, with the result that much of the value of the EITC is skimmed off 
 RAL providers.243  Admittedly, government provision of the loan services would diminish the 
viders’ profits, effectively transferring wealth from the RAL-provider’s shareholders to poor 
useholds.  Assuming, however, that the shareholders are on average much wealthier than the 
 C.  Accelerate the Costs of Carbon 
As we have described, in the special case of a pigouvian consumption tax, such as a cap-
d-trade regime, present-biased consumers may over-consume the undesirable good, especially 
away from socially undesirable behavior.  In particular, since the problem stems from 
                                                 
 Sullivan, supra note 66, at 37. 
We owe this piggyback idea to the CBPP, which has also argued for providing any carbon tax rebate 
ctronically, albeit without mentioning any of the cognitive features we have highlighted.  Greenstein et al., supra 
T.C. § 32. 
See National Consumer Law Center, Inc., supra note 110, at 12. 
240 See
241 
ele
note 11, at 10--1. 
242 
243 
244 Alternatively, society could reduce the total transfer to rebate recipients to leave them at the same level as they 
formerly received, net of RAL fees.  This might be superior in welfare terms to shifting all the money to recipients 
in the event that society has some third use for the money that generates more welfare than either other option.  This 
could include a more efficient means of improving the well-being of the rebate recipients.   
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ns of our project.  First, it might be argued that distributive fairness should be 
asured, not annually, but instead across the entire span of each individual’s lifetime.  In the 
o choose to forego borrowing against a rebate or consume quickly their prebate are simply 
ximizing their own preferences, and therefore that it would be paternalistic to change those 
consumers overvaluing the present, policy-makers should attempt to shift the costs of carbon 
consumption forward.  This can be done while maintaining distributional neutrality. 
 
ap rent co
co
Th
purchases will threaten to force the holder to engage in an unpleasant opt-out procedure.   
 Whether or not debit-cards are in use, the government could also require the 
“p
license w  
bi
lik
fact may reduce welfare for short-sighted households, and suggested some “nudge”-like 
solutions. ions.  Both objections go to the 
foundatio
me
long gaze of a lifetime view, brief timing mismatches between income and expenditures might 
be no more than a blink of a welfarist’s eye.  Secondly, it could also be claimed that individuals 
wh
ma
If government adopts the self-directed debit card, one approach to accelerating the 
pa sts of carbon might be to “penalize” carbon-intensive purchases.  The carbon-tax 
mponent of any purchase might count double or triple against the card’s weekly allocation.  
at will make it harder to make large, impulsive carbon-intensive purchases, and even small 
urchase” of a license to use carbon-intensive products, such as gasoline.  The money for the 
ould be rebated, plus interest, at the end of the month or year.  However, since present-
ased consumers have a discount rate much higher than the market rate, this exchange will feel 
e a loss, making high-intensity carbon consumption much less attractive.    
V.  OBJECTIONS & QUESTIONS 
To this point we have argued that putatively distributionally-neutral consumption taxes in 
  In this Part we consider in depth two important object
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outcomes.  We believe both these objections are misplaced, but recognize that for others they 
will retain strong appeal. 
 A.  Lifetime vs. Annual Equity 
Met  that the best measure of the burden of 
an emissi
studies claim that seen from a long-term perspective carbon taxes are not as regress others 
claim.   The lifetime perspective is said to mitigate inequality for several reasons.  Most 
sim
be
tot
ind
periods, 
lifetime equity theory offers no reason to set aside the distributional consequences of a 
co
 1.  Problems Identifying High Marginal-Utility Households 
A second argument in favor of lifetime equity suggests that even if saving and borrowing 
is imp en
                                                
calf and other environmental economists argue
ons tax would be based on its total effects over a lifetime.245  Thus, for example, a few 
ive as 
246
ply, if individuals can save and borrow perfectly, the economic burden of any one year could 
 spread out over their life, so that any nonrecurring expense affects welfare only if it reduces 
al lifetime income.247  We have already shown, however, considerable evidence that 
ividuals cannot effectively smooth the impact of a tax and rebate system over even short 
let alone their lifetimes.  As a result, whatever its general merits, this version of the 
nsumption tax.248  The other versions are more challenging, as we now explain. 
erfect, there frequ tly remains a mismatch between income and true wealth, so that a 
 
supra note 15, at 145; Kevin A. Hassett, Aparna Mathur, & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Consumer Burd
 Tax on Gasoline, AEI Working Paper #147, at 3 (May 26, 2009); Jorgenson et al., supra note 27, at 
245 Bull et al., en 
of a Carbon
395; see also Don Fullerton & Diane Lim Rogers, Lifetime Versus Annual Perspectives on Tax Incidence, 44 NAT’L 
TAX J. 277
246 Bull et a
Jacobsen et al., supra note 36, at 486. 
247 
248 
mis-measures welfare, since a dollar may have different utility to the taxpayer at different times); Dinan & Lim 
Rogers, supra note 5, at 217 (suggesting that since capital markets are not perfect, annual incidence is also 
im
, 277--78 (1991) (making this argument about taxes generally). 
l., supra note 15, at 146, 161; Burtraw et al., supra note 59, at 22; Hassett et al., supra note 245, at 9; 
Hassett et al., supra note 245, at 3. 
See Shaviro, supra note 34, at 771 (explaining that where some taxpayers cannot borrow fully, lifetime income 
portant).  Some lifetime equity proponents acknowledge this point.  Bull et al., supra note 15, at 149. 
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person with low income this year might still derive relatively little marginal utility from 
government transfers.   This would raise the possibility that current income, and even current 
m a
Th
sch
go
expenditure of a given amount.  Conventionally, we assume that households with the least wealth 
will suffer the most from a set amount of tax.   But if some households have unmeasurable 
we
ge
of ents.  The Busdriver family has a head of household in the 
middle of her career and at the peak of her earning potential.  The Student family is headed by a 
young woman enrolled in law school (her annual income comes from three months at a law 
fir
tig
Stu
ho
fraction of their budget.253  So the welfare effect of the tax this year is equal for both households, 
                                                
 
249
easurable wealth, do not alw ys clearly predict an individual’s marginal utility from money.  
e goal of a distributionally-neutral tax is to make certain that the welfare effects of a tax 
eme are shared equally across the population.250  In order to make such a scheme work, the 
vernment must make assumptions about how much utility a household will lose from an 
251
alth, those assumptions are untrue.252  Proposals aimed at helping the poor might be too 
nerous to these families. 
To take a concrete example, consider two three--person households with annual earnings 
$20,000, the Busdrivers and Stud
m).  If hit by a consumption tax, both may be able to  rely on credit to get them through their 
ht times.  But if so the ultimate burden of paying off those loans will be far lighter for the 
dents.  For the Busdrivers, the additional payments will always be a significant chunk of 
usehold income, while someday the Students’ credit-card bills will represent only a tiny 
 
249 
Fu
volatile incomes may be misidentified as poor). 
250 
251 
252 Hassett et al., supra note 245, at 2;  Bull et al., supra note 15, at 148 (“[E]lderly people drawing down their 
sav
253 e B
- for example, because they anticipate their future liquidity crunch, and thus refrain from incurring more debt.  But 
Bull et al., supra note 15, at 148; Hassett et al., supra note 245, at 2--4; Jacobsen et al., supra note 36, at 478; see 
llerton & Lim Rogers, supra note 245, at 278 (observing that workers with “average permanent income” but 
Metcalf, supra note 4, at 14. 
Harsanyi, supra note 42, at 254. 
 see
ings in retirement will look poor when in fact they may be comfortably well off in a lifetime context.”). 
Of course, it is also possible that th usdriver family will not borrow to make up for lost present consumption --
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but in time the Busdrivers struggle more.  If society has many more Students than Busdrivers, 
what looks like an unfair tax this year may turn out to be a minor nuisance.          
function i
we
di 254
welfare function two ways: directly, and also through the preferences of others for societies with 
much or little such hardship.   Thus, a society in which most people would prefer to see 
ex
inc
lif the other 
descriptive.  On the normative side, the proponents are assuming that future welfare effects 
should be counted as part of the total welfare effect of a current-year policy.   We agree that is 
a s
all
ba
One problem with this argument is that it appears to assume that the social welfare 
s based on long-term rather than current utility.  To remind our readers, the social 
lfare function is the sum of everyone’s preferences, including their preferences for the 
stribution of other goods.   In this way, the hardships of poor families can enter the social 
255
tensive redistribution from rich to poor might be made worse off by a policy change that 
reased total wealth by transferring money from poor to rich.256   
Accordingly, in asserting that lifetime well-being is more important than current utility, 
etime equity proponents are actually making two separate claims, one normative, 
257
ensible thing to do --- no one would want to make everyone $1 richer today by bankrupting us 
 next year --- but it raises the question of whether there ought to be a time discount.  Most 
nkers would rather have money now than next year.258  Should the social welfare function 
                                                                                                                                                             
re difficult case, which we take the lifetime equity proponents to be focused on, is the one in which present 
ervers cannot distinguish the well-being of the two families.   
in that case we can easily measure the difference between the two families, based on their borrowing behavior.  The 
mo
obs
254 ADLER & POSNER, supra note 22, at 23. 
255 ADLER & POSNER, supra note 22, at 25. 
256 See Inge Mayeres & Stef Proost, Marginal Tax Reform, Externalities and Income Distribution, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 
343, 355 (2001) (arguing that social welfare function should include measure of society’s aversion to inequality). 
257 That is, the lifetime equity position seems to be that in deciding whether a consumption tax is unfair, we must 
measure not by what happens this year, but instead what happens over the entire lifetime of those affected.   
258 Solum, supra note 23, at 196. 
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count effects fifty years hence as having the same value as those that happen now?  There is a 
complex literature on this question, which we want only to flag and sidestep for now.    
welfare ef
po
ca
preferences might be present-oriented in this way strikes us as both plausible and morally 
defensible.   If people care about what their society looks like, they may care about what it 
loo
we
pre
qu
worse off as a result of a consumption tax even if the directly-entering lifetime utility portion of 
the social welfare function is positive.  Neither we nor lifetime-equity proponents can resolve the 
iss
259
On the descriptive side, preferences for fair present distributions might outweigh any other 
fects.  Even if lifetime equity is superior as a normative matter, it is possible that 
pular distributive preferences rest on judgments about current welfare.260  That is, people may 
re that others suffer now, even if those same others will be better off later (or vice-versa).  That 
261
ks like now, or what it looks like by measures that are more readily observable than lifetime 
lfare.  In any event, for a welfarist who takes preferences largely as given, whether society 
fers to measure distribution on a yearly or lifetime basis is a descriptive question --- a 
estion of fact.  A society with strong preferences for current distributions might view itself as 
ue through abstract debate.     
                                                 
V. 1383 (2009); Neil H. Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future Generations?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1237 (2009); 
niel Shaviro, The Long-Term U.S. Fiscal Gap: Is the Main Problem Generational Inequity?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. 
See Solum, supra note 23, at 199 (noting that pr
t current generation has preferences for the treatm
259 For extended discussion, see Nancy J. Altman, Social Security and Intergenerational Justice, 77 GEO. WASH. L. 
RE
Da
REV. 1298 (2009). 
260 esentists would count welfare of future lives only to the extent 
tha ent of the future). 
261 While the moral question is, again, one that we wish largely to bracket, we should say a word or two to suggest 
the plausibility of the “presentist” view.  (We owe this term to Solum, supra note 23, at 198.)  One possibility is that 
mo
can
unk
(“I
be  to others with whom we are engaged in an ongoing project of mutual governance.  We 
sha
no
ha
cf. J
co
gen
ral obligations to provide for the welfare of others are cabined by our ability to know others’ well-being.  We 
not be held responsible for what we cannot reasonably know.  Lifetime utility may well be sufficiently 
nowable that it cannot serve as the basis for our responsibilities.  See Dinan & Lim Rogers, supra note 5, at 218 
t is not possible to actually observe lifetime income for individual households . . . .”).  Another possibility would 
that our obligations flow
re that project only partially with those who will follow us; perhaps they will honor our decisions, but perhaps 
t.  If not, it may be reasonable for us to assume that the long-term results of our decisions are largely out of our 
nds, in the same way that the welfare of citizens of other nations is only tenuously connected to our own acts.  But 
OHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 160 (Erin Kelly ed. 2001) (arguing that members of 
mmunity owe obligation to leave as many resources to next generation as members would have wanted previous 
eration to leave to them).     
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Even if lifetime wealth were the appropriate theoretical yardstick for household welfare, 
the policy implications would likely be small.  Again, the upshot of the lifetime equity critique 
we
Ho
fa
de
rebate to a family that does not need one.263  The cost to society is the opportunity cost of the use 
of these funds --- that is, the money for the rebate reduces general funds available for other uses.  
So
If 
hig
ch 265
 are discussing now is that current wealth or income are sometimes poor predictors of welfare.  
wever, according to the literature, these errors are all false positives --- instances where a 
mily that looks poor is not.262  But false positives here are much less significant for policy 
sign than false negatives.  The cost of a false positive is relatively small: society grants a 
 we must either give up that much in other programs, or raise taxes by an equivalent amount.  
we choose to raise taxes, the cost of the false positive is the incremental deadweight loss of the 
her tax rate.264  Unless false positives are large relative to the size of the entire population, the 
ange in tax rates needed to pay for them will be minor.    
                                                 
Note that the amount of the erroneous transfer to the Student family is not a loss to societ
fare also counts towards the social welfare function.   
262 Hassett et al., supra note 245, at 2; see Bull et al., supra note 15, at 148. 
263 y, since the Students’ 
wel
264 “Deadweight loss” refers to the welfare cost to society of raising taxes.  For example, if I prefer watching hockey 
to watching curling, but hockey is taxed, I may attend a curling match instead of a hockey game.  That decision 
lowers my welfare, without raising any additional revenue for the government.  This loss of welfare is the 
“deadweight loss” of the tax.  RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PR
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pa ates.  In theory, a policy-setter should 
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of 
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opp r some of the burden of the tax.  Cf. James Murray, Climate Bill Democrats 
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ACTICE 280 (5th ed. 1989). 
Measuring the deadweight loss of carbon taxes is a complex undertaking because of the way in which they 
 interact with existing taxes and policies.  Ekins & Barker, supra note 15, at 82--89.  However, there is no 
rticular reason society must use higher carbon taxes to pay for extra reb
ose the revenue instrument with the least deadweight loss.  Estimates of U.S. taxes have found deadweight losses 
some forms of tax as low as 17%.  Charles L. Ballard et al., General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal 
lfare Costs of Taxes in the United States, AM. ECON. REV. 128, 128 (1985).   
Even if the increased costs are to be paid strictly out of carbon tax revenues, that choice might actually 
rease welfare.  It seems likely that any carbon price will initially be set below optimal because of political 
osition from industries that will bea
veil Free Pollution Permit Proposals, BUSINESSGREEN, Oct. 26, 2009 (reporting likelihood of “giveaways” of 
bon dioxide permits in proposed legislation).  In that case, increases in the carbon tax rate will actually improve 
erall efficiency.    
 For example, suppose a rebate of $1,200, the average current estimate.  See supra note 11.  At 17%, see Ballard 
l., supra note 264, at 128, that implies a deadweight loss per error of $204.  We assume here that recipients of 
se-positive rebates are, on average, no richer or poorer than the general population, so that the erroneous 
istribution has no other welfare effects.   
 In contrast, the utility losses from false negatives are large.  We define a false negative 
here as a failure to award a rebate to a family that would suffer disproportionately from a 
co
Th
tra
cr
can be dramatic for impoverished families.267  And in addition to the cost to these families 
directly, society would also experience a loss of welfare from failing to achieve its own 
su
pol  be misguided.  In order for a false-
positive-r
we eliminated many more false positives than negatives with the policy.  Considering that the 
very premise of the false-positives argument is that measurements are difficult and take 
ge
So
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nsumption tax in the absence of the rebate --- failing to recognize a poor household as poor.  
us, the social cost of a false negative is the amount of welfare that would have resulted from 
nsferring the rebate to a poor family.266  As we have discussed, evidence from the cost of 
edit and other factors suggests that the welfare consequences of these accidental redistributions 
bjectively-defined preferred fair distribution.   
The relative sizes of false positives and negatives are important because they imply that 
icies aimed at eliminating false positives are quite likely to
educing policy to increase social welfare overall, we would need to be confident that 
nerations to assess,268 it is hard to believe we could draw that conclusion with any confidence.  
, for instance, a policy aimed at denying rebates to families with long-term borrowing 
tential would likely be a welfare loser: while it would cut off the rebate from some Students, it 
uld also accidentally deny rebates to some needy Busdrivers.  Unless the policy successfully 
                                                 
Put another way, the cost of the false negative is the utility of the rebate in the poor family’s hands minus the 
Recall that many households are willing to pay fees on the order of $30 to $135 in order to accelerate a paycheck 
no more than two weeks, for an annual percentage rate between 150 and 300%.  See supra text accompanying 
.  Although some of these excess payments may be due to mistakes, for rational borrowers this price differential 
plies a very substantial difference in the perceived utility of additional funds.  But cf. Alvin Warren, Would a 
266 
average utility of that same amount in the hands of other taxpayers.   
267 
by 
notes 109--113.  At the lower bound, that is roughly twenty to thirty times what middle-income borrowers would 
pay
im
Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1100 (1980) (doubting that preferences for 
present over deferred income can be used to measure the utility of use of that income).  Unfortunately, we cannot 
put a precise number on this cost, as (somewhat infamously) economics has no established tools for doing so.               
268 Bull et al., supra note 15, at 148. 
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finds many more Students than Busdrivers, it will reduce social welfare.  It may be true that 
some families that look poor by some measures in fact would not be not heavily burdened by a 
co
 2.  Even Steven Theories 
A th m, albeit one mostly inchoate in the economics 
literature, seems to assume that inequalities even out over time, regardless of whether income 
smoothing is possible.   Seinfeld fans might call this the “even steven” theory.   In this view, 
lifetim
tha b
ex
po
and so 273
                                                
nsumption tax.  But that is small comfort to those that are persistently poor.   
ird version of the lifetime equity clai
269 270
es have more moral significance than any arbitrary unit of measured time, so that a policy 
t is unfair to some is justifia le if it is later unfair in favor of those same individuals.271  For 
ample, though the elderly are hit harder by a consumption tax because they spend a larger 
rtion of their budget,272 we should not be concerned, because in their youths they mostly saved 
avoided much of the burden of the tax.    
 
269 For example, the so-called “additive” lifetime utility function presumes that we ought to compare individuals 
simply by adding up all the good and bad that happens to them throughout their life.  See Jorgenson et al., supra note 
27, at 400 (measuring equity of carbon tax assuming an “additive intertemporal utility function”).  Thus, the claim 
that a carbon tax is not regressive over the lifetime, utilizing an additive utility function, assumes that good events 
happening later in life can counterbalance bad events earlier, and vice-versa.   
270 Seinfeld: The Opposite (NBC television broadcast May 19, 1994). 
271 See Fullerton & Lim Rogers, supra note 245, at 278 (asserting that one measure of distributive fairness of a tax is 
its total lifetime burden).  We assume this view does not contemplate the charlie browns of the world, who 
justifi
 
sop
272
Dif
273
cy & Lim Rogers, 
sup hould be factored into 
ana
ably ask,  “Why isn’t [life] ever unfair in my favor?” 
We concede that this may be a straw-man version of the argument, but we are unaware of any more 
histicated articulation. 
 Malcolm Gillis, Peter Mieszkowski and George R. Zodrow, Indirect Consumption Taxes: Common Issues and 
ferences Among the Alternative Approaches, 51 TAX L. REV. 725, 746-48 (1996). 
 See Bull et al., supra note 15, at 161 (“[B]ecause energy taxes have different incidence effects across the life 
c it is important to measure the burden of taxes in terms of lifetime incidence….”); Fullerton le, 
ra note 245, at 278 (stating that patterns of income and spending across age groups s
lysis of the fairness of the incidence of a tax). 
  
74
This theory depends, however, on several questionable assumptions.  First, it presumes that 
what happens to a person later in life is morally relevant to their earlier experiences.  That is not 
ne
 taken, we 
agree wit
for 275
utility of wealth, families may prefer to have good events happen sooner and bad events later.  
Studies suggest that most people in fact have preferences for the timing of their consumption.   
If 
for
qu
279
the time of implementation, a new consumption tax will aff eholds at all stages of life.  If 
the tax evens out only over a lifetime, many will never even out.  Thus, for lifecycle balancing to 
work, alre
or
                                                
cessarily the case, as Professor Zelenak has recently argued.274   
Next, while we would not go as far as Zelenak suggests his arguments can be
h Lee Fennell that any sophisticated “even steven” theory must explain how to account 
 gaps in time between good and bad events.   Even putting aside the diminishing marginal 
276
government policy disrupts this pattern, it ought arguably to overpay in order to compensate 
 the time value of the misplaced consumption.277  In addition, of course, there is the basic 
estion of the time value of gains and losses.278           
Lastly, the even-steven analysis assumes a perfectly designed set of transition rules.   At 
ect hous
ady-existing households must get special rules, whether grandfathering, extra rebates, 
 something else.   
 
274
275
REV. 1151, 1178--81 (2006) (doubting that multi-year comparisons between most taxpayers are meaningful). 
276 te 30, at 1811; see Fennell & Stark, supra note 12, at 51--52 (summarizing other 
stu
277 Cf. Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the “SALT” 
Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 849--50 (2008) (arguing that in order for the benefits and burdens of 
government to even out over time, government must compensate citizens who must wait for the benefits).  Further, 
both planning for and adjusting to misfortunes may carry additional costs, Shaviro, supra note 34, at 772--73, which 
wo
278 
30 
ma
279 
tim unt for transition costs). 
 Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Policy and Personal Identity Over Time, 62 TAX L. REV. 333, 338, 357--66 (2009). 
 Fennell, supra note 30, at 12--13; see also Neil Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX 
 Browning & Lusardi, supra no
dies).   
uld also have to be accounted for in order to balance the welfare ledger. 
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation, 18 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 
(1982) (observing that the opportunity for savings implies that lifetime smoothing of year-to-year inequalities 
ill be inequitable).   y st
Cf. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 22, at 20--21 (stating that Kaldor-Hicks claim that utilities can even out over 
e fails to acco
 75
 
B.  Paternalism 
Another common argument against government policies aimed at remedying cognitive or 
willpowe
ob
ma
swee
choices, but claims that government should not help to correct those errors, because government 
inte
bo
pat x 
problem a
claiming that government should not second-guess revealed preferences is futile because second-
gues
ser
r failures is that they are paternalistic.  In the strongest form of the paternalism 
jection, the complaint is that the government cannot second-guess choices other individuals 
ke; if an individual acts, we must presume that her actions maximize her welfare.280  A less-
ping version of the objection acknowledges that people can make mistake with their own 
rvention reduces our incentives to learn to make better decisions for ourselves.281  We have 
th taken issue with these kinds of arguments in more detail elsewhere.282 
For our purposes here, we simply accept the possible validity of either form of the 
ernalism objection, but note that neither has much bite in the context of the consumption ta
nd the solutions we recommend for it.  In the case of the strong form of the objection, 
sing here is inevitable.  As Sunstein and Thaler have pointed out, designers of a government 
vice must make decisions about how to structure their program, and every possible structure 
                                                 
ice is best available evidence of what consumers want); Robert Sugden, On Nudging, 16 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 
, 365--73 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008)) (claiming that “nudging” 
280 See Claire A. Hill, Anti-Anti-Antipaternalism, 2 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 444, 445 (2007) (arguing that consumer 
cho
365
allows policy makers to substitute their own preferences for those of the public).  But cf. On Amir & Orly Lobel, 
Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2120--23 
(2008) (acknowledging claim that nudges impose normative judgment of public officials but arguing that this is both 
inevitable and desirable). 
281 Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1626, 1633--41 (2006).  Glaeser argues in addition that in the abstract governments will be less 
apt
49
alth
rig
282
De
 at identifying cognitive errors.  Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 142--
 (2006).  But this argument is less trenchant as a reason to oppose responses to an already-identified error, 
ough it does suggest that any third party should be appropriately modest in their beliefs that their solution is the 
ht one.   
 Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the “SALT” 
duction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 819--23 (2008). 
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may well have cognitive implications.283  Responsible designers who wish to maximize welfare 
must attempt to assess the welfare consequences of each alternative.  In Sunstein and Thaler’s 
ex
be
an
pre
choice.285 
Similarly, designing a consumption-tax rebate offers a choice of evils.  If the rebate is 
iss f the year, some individuals will fail to smooth that income forward over the 
course of 
pa
ind
is a preference arguably entitled to respect.  So a respon le welfare-maximizing planner 
choosing between these alternatives (or, as we will explain, some hybrid combinations) must 
ne
go
be
Similarly, prebate recipients need not spend down their prebate in the month after it hits their 
                                                
 
ample, a cafeteria must decide which food to put nearest to the register; those foods will sell 
tter than others.284  So, does the cafeteria want to sell more fruit or more Twinkies?  It is no 
swer to say that we should simply respect consumers’ revealed preferences, because which 
ference is revealed itself depends (literally, in the cafeteria example) on the architecture of the 
ued at the end o
the year.  Arguably, that is evidence of a preference for savings, which an anti-
ternalist would say ought to be respected.286  If instead the government issues a prebate, some 
ividuals will spend the money immediately, again failing to smooth over the year.  That, too, 
sib
cessarily make a judgment about which set of preferences she would prefer to satisfy. 
Sunstein and Thaler also emphasize that the paternalism objection is blunted when 
vernment policies preserve opportunities for choice.287  No one has to buy a banana just 
cause it sits, all yellow and temptingly packed with potassium goodness,288 beside the register.  
 
283 
284 
285 See id. at 2 (arguing that attempting to arrange food in way that consumers would want begs question of how to 
kno
286 
287 See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 240 (distinguishing their suggestions from other forms of paternalism 
bec
288 
ed., Blackwell 2002).   
Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 240--41, 249--50. 
Id. at 1--3. 
w which choice consumers would prefer). 
Of course, this assumes we are confident there are no liquidity constraints.  
ause theirs still “retain freedom of choice”). 
See HESTER H. VORSTER AND  FRANS J. KOK, INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN NUTRITION, 192--93 (Michael J. Gibney 
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mailbox.  Policy options that merely structure, rather than determine, outcomes are more 
consistent with individual freedom.   
ely agrees with these points but argues that 
“an unhee
wh
ou 291
overstated.  As we have argued, part of the efficacy of defaults is that they trade on the inherent 
present-bias of time-inconsistent actors.  The actual cost of overcoming the default is tiny; it is 
onl
the
be
de
Under the second form of paternalist objection, though, even choice architecture and 
default rules are suspect.  For example, Klick and Mitchell aver that default rules weaken our 
ab ur own errors by rendering us mentally lazy, dependent on the government to 
spot our m
289
In an important recent draft, Lee Fennell larg
ded nudge leaves the opter-out worse off than before.”290  She claims it is unclear 
ether the cost of this added burden for those who (wrongly) override the government’s default 
tweighs the benefits of nudging others in the right direction.   We think this worry is 
y the fact that it must be incurred now that makes it loom large.292  Thus, while we agree that 
 costs of opting out can be deadweight losses for some individuals, those losses are likely to 
 small (viewed ex post) relative to the benefits that would accrue to those who abide by the 
fault.       
ility to correct o
istakes and design defaults to avoid them.293  That is, government aid induces a kind 
                                                 
We acknowledge that this position does not fully answer the objection that g ernment lacks adequate 289 ov
information to set the correct default position.  See, e.g., Glaeser, supra note , at 151 (claiming that libertarian 
paternalism is unattractive to those who think that problem with paternalism is government errors).  The opportunity 
for individual choice, however, will tend to limit the size of any government error, because if the default is wrong by 
a sufficiently large amount then we should expect a larger portion of the population to reject it.    
290 Fennell, supra note 30, at 44--45. 
291 Id. at 45--46. 
292 This feature allows policy makers to design defaults that are specifically targeted at people who are present-
biased; individuals who do not heavily discount future costs & benefits simply override the default and choose their 
own rule.     
293 Klick & Mitchell, supra note 281, at 1626; see also Fennell, supra note 30, at 28 (noting this possibility). 
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of moral hazard, which individuals fail to invest in efforts to reduce cognitive errors because the 
government is insuring them against cognitive losses.  
ct , though, it does not 
follow tha
ha
of 295
balancing between hazard costs and “insurance” benefits.    
While we admit hazard costs are difficult to specify, there is reason to think that the 
“in r one thing, as we 
have seen
fam
tho 296
savings to overcome their temptation to immediate spending, they are doing an extremely poor 
job of it: many save only until the end of the year, then quickly dissipate the rebate.   Yet there 
is in
ye
pol
themselves.  A well-designed policy might actually increase incentives to invest in willpower by 
      
 
294
If we have understood the “cognitive hazard” argument corre ly
t government should refuse to prevent cognitive errors.  Insurance that induces moral 
zard is not always welfare-reducing, depending on the costs of under-investment and the value 
insurance.   So the appropriate cognitive policy analysis for Klick and Mitchell should be a 
surance” benefits of a well-designed consumption tax are very large.  Fo
, errors in income smoothing can be very costly in utility terms for low-income 
ilies.  Perhaps more importantly, there is evidence that self-help mechanisms for overcoming 
se errors are simply ineffectual.   If taxpayers are using their rebates as a form of forced 
297
little reason to think that May of the follow g year is consistently the best time to spend a 
ar’s savings.   
In the face of such persistent failures, it would not be surprising if a hands-off government 
icy actually weakened willpower by demoralizing those who try and repeatedly fail to restrain 
                                           
 Mitchell, supra note 281, at 1626. 
employment Insurance, 10 J. PUB. ECON. 379, 379--402 (1978). 
See GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 143--60 (2001) (discussing commitment devices and their failures); 
rall welfare); Barr & Dokko, supra note 120, at 20--21 (finding that taxpayers are inefficiently overwithholding 
enerate tax rebates). 
294 Klick &
295 On the tradeoffs between insurance and moral hazard, see Martin Neil Baily, Some Aspects of Optimal 
Un
296 
Angeletos et al., supra note 84, at 59 (describing how use of illiquid investments as commitment device lowers 
ove
to g
297 Id. at 16. 
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increasing the returns to investment.  We hope that our proposals would move policy in that 
direction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ove sumption tax literature has yet to truly grapple with the 
welfare im
econ
change.  We have attempted to set out here evidence that, at a minimum, human cognition and 
credi
su
all
be
rall, it seems clear that the con
plications of major transactional consumption taxes.  That is especially true of 
omic dislocations that will surely attend any efforts to slow the onset of global climate 
t markets will play large roles in the ultimate fairness of any carbon tax.  We have also 
ggested several novel solutions that could mitigate these distributional impacts while still 
owing climate-change prevention to move forward.  No doubt, however, there are other and 
tter solutions; we hope our contributions offer a small step towards finding them.   
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